Tuesday, September 6, 2016


[9/4/16]  We have forensically picked apart Deutsche Bank in a way that no other entity ever has, likely including Deutsche Bank itself. While we may not know all of its secrets, we likely now know more than almost everybody else. We will publish our findings to Veritaseum Knowledge clients early this week, but in the meantime we will put little teasers out to the public for the sake of conversation. “Why?”, you may ask. Well, everybody already knows that Deutsche Bank is a basket case, but we are showing our clients that the real short opportunities and true systemic risks lie within DB’s counterparties, whom have identified and are in the process of putting share price targets on. The first forensic report on the most proximal counterparty with an elevated share price is done, and the first counterparty share price target will be published to European Bank Contagion Assessment, Forensic Analysis & Valuation subscribers within 48 hours. There are several more to follow. In the meantime and in between time, let’s discuss Deutsche in detail that you will find nowhere else on the web or on Wall Street.
Last week we illustrated what appears to be a slam dunk finding of Deutsche Bank fraud under the UK Fraud Act of 2006, reference “Veritaseum Knowledge Exposes Frightening Counterparty Risk At Deutsche Bank for “Gold Investors”“. In said piece, we tracked down DB’s alleged failure to deliver physical gold upon demand redemption of one of it’s subsidiary’s gold derivative instruments and superimposed it against DB’s counterparty risk and blatant contradictions between it’s marketing material (ie. website) and it’s prospectus (which itself actually had material and confusing contradictions) – as excerpted:
  • …”an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold”, but
    • No correlation with the gold price“, and
    • and “The value of the Notes is a function of demand and supply regarding the Notes as such and not of the demand for and supply of gold”, but
    • “For potential purchasers of the Notes the pricing may, apart from the gold price, also be determined by other factors (e.g., the creditworthiness of the Issuer, the evaluation of these risk factors or the liquidity of the Notes).” – keeping in mind that Deutsche Bank believes
    • There’s no movement in counterparty risks yearly, or cumulatively, due to collateralization (where said collateral is wide open to market forces and valuations) for instruments.
    • No control of genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold Neither the Issuer nor the Depositary Agent or any other agent of the Issuer will control the genuineness or fineness of the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer by Clearstream Banking AG in its capacity as Depositary Agent.
Oh, there’s more, for those of you who believed that line “an investor is, from an economic point of view, invested in gold“.
The purchasers of the Notes will only acquire the rights securitised by the Notes. The purchasers of the Notes will not acquire any title to, or security interests or beneficial ownership in, the physical Gold held in custody on behalf of the Issuer. An investment in the Notes does not constitute a purchase or other acquisition of Gold.
This comment excerpts the requirements of the UK Fraud Act of 2006, since the DB derivative issue was sold to UK investors. It clearly shows the material uncovered in our article can garner the label of fraud in the UK. There”s actually much more in the article if you click the aforereferenced link, but I believe many can get the message. So, where does this leave us? Well, it appears as if DB is prepping for a rash of fraud and litigation exposure. Looking at numbers buried deep within DB’s more than 650 pages of financial reporting…CONTINUE READING

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