Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Dollar mixed after Bernanke derails rebound

ONDON (MarketWatch) -- The U.S. dollar held its ground versus the euro but slipped versus the Japanese yen Tuesday, holding within recent ranges a day after Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke appeared to derail expectations the central bank would hike interest rates as early as next year.

The dollar index /quotes/comstock/11j!i:dxy0 (DXY 75.89, +0.12, +0.16%) , a measure of the greenback against a trade-weighted basket of major currencies, was up 0.1% at 75.838.

The euro traded at $1.4789 versus the dollar, down from $1.4823 late Monday.

The euro slipped somewhat after data showed German industrial production unexpectedly fell 1.8% in October. Economists had expected a 1% monthly rise following a 3.1% jump in September.

Concerns about the periphery of the euro zone, particularly Greece, also undercut the currency, wrote strategists at Brown Brothers Harriman. Standard & Poor's on Monday placed Greece's A- sovereign debt rating on Creditwatch with negative implications.

A downgrade would make Greece the only nation in the 16-nation euro zone with a rating below A-.

The British pound tumbled 0.9% to $1.6309 versus the dollar. The euro rose 0.6% versus sterling to change hands at 90.67 pence.

Economists said a warning by credit-rating agency Moody's Investors Service that Great Britain and the United States could both test the "boundaries" of their Aaa sovereign rating put pressure on the pound. See story on the Moody's report.

The report categorized both countries as "resilient," but economists said it reignited the risk of an eventual downgrade.

Alan Clarke, economist at BNP Paribas, said the report bore some similarities to past warnings from Standard & Poor's and Fitch that the U.K.'s Aaa status won't be lost as long as the government moves to repair its public finances.

"However, this latest warning is more explicit," he said.

"This is a serious warning shot across the bows to both the current government and its possible future replacement," Clarke said. "The risk of a downgrade in the U.K. has been in the air for some time and on the back of this report, the risk is increasing."

The dollar fell against its Japanese counterpart to buy 88.57 yen, down from 89.47 yen in late North American trade on Monday.

On Monday in North American trading, Bernanke said a fragile economic recovery meant inflation was likely to remain "subdued," signaling the Fed wouldn't hike rates until far in the future.

Asian markets decline; Tokyo snaps six-session rally

HONG KONG (MarketWatch) -- Asian markets ended mostly lower Tuesday, with Japanese stocks snapping a six-session winning streak as exporters dropped on the yen's renewed strength.

Trading volumes were light in several regional markets as investors counted down to the coming holiday season.

"I think we are almost falling into an early Christmas mode," said Martin Lakos, Macquarie Private Wealth division director.

"Volumes are starting to be a bit softer," he added.

The Nikkei 225 Average shed 0.3% to 10,140.47 for its first loss in seven sessions, with a new government stimulus package failing to inspire that market.

Australia's S&P/ASX 200 and Taiwan's Taiex slipped 0.1% each.

South Korea's Kospi ended down 0.3% and China's Shanghai Composite declined 1.1%.

Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index fell 1.2%, as heavyweight stock HSBC Holdings dropped for a third session amid reports that Dubai World is in talks with its bank creditors, including HSBC, after recently seeking a standstill on billions of dollars of its debt. HSBC /quotes/comstock/22h!e:5 (HK:5 90.55, -1.80, -1.95%) /quotes/comstock/13*!hbc/quotes/nls/hbc (HBC 56.54, -2.12, -3.61%) shares dropped 2%.

In afternoon trading, India's Sensex rose 0.5%, while Singapore's Straits Times Index was flat.

U.S. stocks ended broadly lower in the previous session, following a speech by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke.

"The market just wanted to get some kind of indication on the outlook for rates. What we heard was no different to what we already knew -- that rates would stay exceptionally low for an extended period," said David Taylor at CMC Markets in Sydney.

Banks were generally weaker across the region, in line with their U.S. peers, as the recent better-than-expected U.S. economic data, in particular Friday's employment report, have raised the possibility of higher interest rates ahead, despite Mr. Bernanke's continued dovish stance.

In Sydney, National Australia Bank /quotes/comstock/22x!e:nab (AU:NAB 27.89, -0.11, -0.39%) /quotes/comstock/11i!nabzy (NABZ.Y 25.37, -0.48, -1.86%) slipped 0.4% and Commonwealth Bank of Australia /quotes/comstock/22x!e:cba (AU:CBA 53.00, -0.70, -1.30%) /quotes/comstock/11i!cbauf (CBAUF 49.50, +2.00, +4.21%) slid 1.3%.

Shinhan Financial /quotes/comstock/13*!shg/quotes/nls/shg (SHG 81.00, -0.83, -1.01%) eased 0.6% in Seoul, Mizuho Financial Group /quotes/comstock/13*!mfg/quotes/nls/mfg (MFG 3.71, -0.07, -1.85%) /quotes/comstock/!8411 (JP:8411 170.00, +1.00, +0.59%) fell 2.4% and Shinsei Bank /quotes/comstock/11i!sklky (SKLK.Y 2.46, +0.01, +0.41%) slumped 6.4% in Tokyo.

Bank of China /quotes/comstock/11i!bachy (BACH.Y 14.49, -0.06, -0.41%) /quotes/comstock/22h!e:3988 (HK:3988 4.35, -0.07, -1.58%) /quotes/comstock/28c!e:601988 (CN:601988 4.23, -0.06, -1.40%) lost 1.4% in Shanghai and 1.6% in Hong Kong, while DBS Group Holdings /quotes/comstock/11i!dbsdy (DBSD.Y 42.90, 0.00, 0.00%) gave up 0.5% in Singapore trading.

In Tokyo, exporters were trading lower as the yen gained against the dollar. But "selling is not due to negative sentiment; it's because the market is overheated," said Fujio Ando, strategist at Chibagin Asset Management. Nissan Motor /quotes/comstock/11i!nsan.y (NSAN.Y 16.45, +0.01, +0.06%) /quotes/comstock/!7201 (JP:7201 743.00, +15.00, +2.06%) declined 0.9%, with Nikon /quotes/comstock/11i!ninoy (NINO.Y 191.75, +6.75, +3.65%) /quotes/comstock/!7731 (JP:7731 1,734, +87.00, +5.28%) and Canon /quotes/comstock/13*!caj/quotes/nls/caj (CAJ 41.33, +0.29, +0.71%) /quotes/comstock/!7751 (JP:7751 3,750, +120.00, +3.31%) falling 1.1% each.

Reaction to the Japanese government's new stimulus package was muted. The government earlier Tuesday unveiled the package, which included 7.2 trillion yen ($80.6 billion) in spending. The stimulus plan is aimed at countering problems threatening the country's flagging economic recovery, such as the yen's strength and deflation. Read full story on the stimulus plan.

UBS senior economist Takuji Aida said the stimulus plan "doesn't necessarily mean that deflationary pressure will ease anytime soon. For that, the government must spend much more."

Several energy stocks declined as crude-oil futures fell to a fresh eight-week low in New York Monday amid concerns about continued weak U.S. oil demand.

Woodside Petroleum /quotes/comstock/22x!e:wpl (AU:WPL 48.20, -0.10, -0.21%) /quotes/comstock/11i!wopey (WOPE.Y 43.85, -0.82, -1.84%) slipped 0.2%, Inpex /quotes/comstock/!1605 (JP:1605 683,000, +15,000, +2.25%) lost 0.6% in Tokyo, with Cnooc /quotes/comstock/22h!e:883 (HK:883 11.88, -0.14, -1.17%) /quotes/comstock/13*!ceo/quotes/nls/ceo (CEO 154.17, -2.46, -1.57%) dropping 1.2% and PetroChina /quotes/comstock/13*!ptr/quotes/nls/ptr (PTR 126.40, -1.46, -1.14%) /quotes/comstock/22h!e:857 (HK:857 9.69, -0.14, -1.42%) sliding 1.6% in Hong Kong.

January Nymex crude-oil futures, which settled 2% lower at $73.93 a barrel Monday, were recently up 3 cents at $73.96 a barrel on Globex.

For crude oil, "there is no lack of bearish factors to choose from at the moment," said a Citi Futures Perspective analyst, Tim Evans. "The operative scenario may depend on whether fund managers walk toward the exits or run," he said.

The dollar was lower at 89.13 yen compared with 89.37 yen, which traders attributed to exporters selling in Japan. The euro was fetching 132.09 yen versus 132.83 yen. Read currencies column.

Lead December Japanese government-bond futures were up 0.18 at 140.09 points. Earlier in the day, Japan's Finance Ministry sold 550.5 billion yen of 2.2% bonds at lowest price of 99.50, which missed Tokyo traders' expectations of 99.80.

9/11 – Has America Been Told The Truth

September 11th, a day that will always be remembered for the way two monumental Manhattan buildings collapsed in the most inconceivable manner marginable. Undoubtedly, that carnage will occupy an indelible leaf in the history of the world, leaving an omnipresent emotional scar on the thousands of families that lost a loved one on that day.

Long before the dust settled after this catastrophe, Americans were questioning the very unprofessional and indifferent manner in which the investigation into this alleged terror attack had been directed and conducted. The clock is ticking perpetually, and yet there has not been any top level government appointed committee to study and go into the startling alternate possibilities of how that fateful day may have evolved.

What half the world or more does not know, and those who did know paid little or no attention to is what can be described only as the bizarre destruction of an ancillary tower of the World Trade Centre, referred to as WTC 7. The available evidence that dawns on crucial facts that this building which was 47 stories high was brought down by a fire can without question be disputed. It was the manner in which the authorities reported the destruction of this skyscraper that led to an in-depth study, especially by the Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth, which gave birth to the theory that this may not have been brought about by fire as reported, but by willful detonation - giving clear indication that a hidden hand planned the attack.

With overwhelming evidence that clearly points a finger at the Bush administration of having carried out a farce of an investigation, it is a puzzle to comprehend that the citizens of the United States of America who pride themselves in pursuing the truth, have not been successful to date in obtaining an executive direction ordering a thorough probe of the 9/11 debacle.

When the results of the last US Presidential election were announced, the whole world paused momentarily, full of hope that Barack Obama, the first African-American President to be elected to lead the free world, would bring to us all justice, fairplay and prosperity.

The whole of America and the rest of us are watching , most of whom are trusting Obama to right the wrongs. A great nation that hurdled to a new frontier by electing the man rather than the race he belongs to, expects nothing other than exceptional governance during his administration.


Date: 11/09/2001

Time: 8.46 AM

Manhattan was flooded by a wave of panic as people watched an airplane crash into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre. It looked like something had one terribly wrong with a normal, everyday airline flight, and by some great chance an airplane had managed to hit one of the World Trade Centre’s Towers. Then as people looked on dumbfounded, another airplane crashed into the South Tower at 9.03 AM.

What was going on? America was under siege. Rumors and accounts of the attacks were spreading like wildfire. Phone lines were blocked, the media was speculating. People were too shocked to even believe what they were
seeing, much less digest the information and think rationally.

What Really Happened

(The story that the world was told)
On the morning of September 11th 2001, hijackers took control of four commercial airliners over the skies of the United States. The aircraft were American Airlines Flight 11 (Boston to Los Angeles), United Airlines Flight 175 (Boston to Los Angeles), American Airlines Flight 77 (Washington to Los Angeles) and United Airlines Flight 93
(Newark to San Francisco). 19 hijackers in all launched a well planned and premeditated attack targeting the World Trade Centre, the SEPTEMBER 11TH 2001 – WAS AMERICA UNDER ATTACK OR WAS THE WORLD BEING HOODWINKED? By Johnny Christy

Pentagon and supposedly the Capitol Building or the White House The hijackers reportedly used tear gas and ace in the process of the hijacking as well as knives to stab the crew and passengers while taking over command of the airplane.

Of the four airplanes hijacked on that day only one, United Airlines Flight 93 failed to reach it’s intended target destination, and this is attributed to the valour of the passengers on board who overpowered the hijackers to regain control of the airplane. Reports say that a hijacker ordered the plane to be rolled when he realised that they were losing control of the aircraft. Flight 93 crashed in Stony Creek Township in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.











(日 本‧東京)據報導,美國總統奧巴馬的朝鮮問題特使博斯沃斯訪問朝鮮期間,可能提出一份經美日韓3國認可的“棄核路線圖”。博斯沃斯週一(12月7日)在韓 國首爾逗留,與韓國外長柳明桓等官員會晤,就朝美對話的議題和方向進行最後協調,並準備於週二(12月8日)訪問朝鮮,與平壤進行為期3天的對話。



























































‘White House security breached 91 times since 1980’

Monday, December 7, 2009

‘White House security breached 91 times since 1980’

Tareq and Michaele Salahi may have become the world's most famous gatecrashers for tricking their way into the White House's state dinner for Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last month, but they are not the first people to breach the US president's security.

A secret report compiled by the Secret Service reveals the security surrounding America's President has been breached at least 91 times since 1980, 'The Washington Post' reported.

A summary of the 2003 report, obtained by the leading US newspaper, contains accounts of many breaches, including a family who were allowed to the White House grounds in minivan, a man believed to be a delivery driver, and a woman previously known to Secret Service agents after she had falsely claimed a "special relationship" with Bill Clinton.

The report states that the list of security breaches exposes significant gaps that could be exploited by "would-be assassins" and erodes "one of the best tools for deterring future attempts" -- the aura of invulnerability around the White House.

A Secret Service official confirmed the authenticity of the "unclassified document" and said it was used to train agents and officers in an effort to improve agency operations.

"This document reflects a proactive attempt to evaluate our security and obviously raises the awareness of uniformed division officers and agents about their jobs. We have to be concerned about the threats to our protectees at all times, whether at the White House or away from the White House," Spokesman Edwin Donovan was quoted as saying.

After the appearance at last month's state dinner by the Salahis, the Secret Service has launched a criminal investigation into the couple and a sweeping internal review of security procedures.

Offering a rare public apology for the incident, the agency's director, Mark Sullivan, characterised it as a "pure and simple... case of human error" in which three uniformed officers let the well-dressed Salahis pass through gates on a rainy night without confirming their names on a guest list.

Oahu braces for monster surf

Surf was higher than usual on O'ahu's North Shore yesterday, but nobody was saying much about it.

Instead, most of the talk focused on 40- to 50-foot waves predicted for tomorrow and how a National Weather Service forecast indicating weather patterns in the Pacific resembled those in early December 1969.

Those patterns resulted in waves so mountainous that they swept away houses, boats, vehicles and even people over several days 40 years ago.

"This well could be the biggest surf in the past decade — and possibly the biggest since 1969," said Randy Rarick, executive director of the Triple Crown of Surfing.

A big swell generated by a pair of extraordinarily powerful storms north by northwest of Hawai'i is expected to arrive tonight and produce waves of up to 40 feet by early tomorrow, with 50-foot sets on the outer reefs through Tuesday night, according to the weather service. The waves will remain above warning levels through Wednesday, it said.

That means the potential for dangerous waves that could threaten property and flood coastal roads as well as currents that are potential threats to even people standing on the beach. Emergency responders on all islands were urging caution and monitoring conditions.

If the big waves actually come to pass, they're certain to put on the kind of show that has made the North Shore famous worldwide.

But the spectacle of waves in this category is one thing. The peril they pose is something else.

"We are expecting an exceptionally large surf event," said weather service forecaster Jonathan Hoag. He described the surf headed for O'ahu as "almost unimaginably big — too big for surfing."

Some who have lived their lives in and around the famed waves of the North Shore had conclusions of their own, based on personal experience.

"I don't think it'll be as big as what we had in 1998," said veteran surfer Peter Cole, 79, who was predicting bunched-up and potentially hazardous waves tomorrow. "And it definitely won't be as big as 1969, in my opinion."

wait for tuesday

Rarick believes kona winds could cause choppy waters that are not conducive to surfing. But favorable winds and even higher surf on Tuesday might produce a moment to remember, he said.

Fabled surfer George Downing, director of the Waimea Bay big-wave surfing competition dedicated to the memory of Eddie Aikau, agreed with Rarick that surfing conditions could vastly improve by Tuesday. The Eddie Aikau competition — held only when wave faces hit 40 feet — would be on for either Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday, he said.

"Yes, it will happen," said Downing. "I'm kind of leaning more toward Tuesday."

But Rarick wondered whether the Tuesday surf might be too oversized at Waimea for the Aikau event.

Invariably, such conversations were measured in comparison to the waves of the first four days of December 1969, which were, according to the weather service, the biggest waves on the North Shore in the past half-century.

Hoag, the weather service forecaster, was there in December, 40 years ago. The experience is burned into his memory.

"I was living on Sunset Beach in 1969 when it happened," recalled Hoag, 62. "There was serious damage — it was a serious matter. I've never seen anything that big that caused that kind of damage."

According to news accounts of the day, humongous waves pounded O'ahu's North Shore between Dec. 1 and Dec. 4. Nearly 2,000 people were evacuated, hundreds were left homeless, and entire houses were tossed from one side of the highway to the other.

Cole remembers, too. Like most of those who there, Cole talks about one particular wave that dwarfed anything seen on the North Shore before or since.

"I saw this massive, dark shadow," he said, recalling the evening near the Hale'iwa side of Waimea Bay. "I saw this white water go all the way through the parking lot and all the way to the highway.

"It was just massive."

Later, near Ke Iki, he said he saw two houses upside-down that had been washed to the opposite side of the road.

Antya Miller, executive director of the North Shore Chamber of Commerce, recalled watching from a tree as a wave passed over her house.

"We lived on the beach at Laniakea, and the water receded, and you could see the crabs, and little fish flopping around and our dog went down and was chasing everything, and we were screaming at him. And then it started coming back up, and it kept coming and coming, and pretty soon we were running and grabbing limbs and climbing up the trees, and hanging on.

"And it went right over our roof."

Noted tow-in surfer Ken Bradshaw, who rode an 85-foot wave in the 1998 North Shore swell, said if the forecast holds — and he cautioned that it might not — the waves could be far more dangerous than those he conquered 11 years ago.

"This has the potential to be as tall as 1998, but because there will be shorter intervals between the waves, it's going to create a lot of chaos and a lot of disorganization," he said. "It will be really dangerous, compared to '98. If it happens, it will be a mess.

"But, we'll try to surf it."

Ex-Controller Alan Hevesi and actress Peggy Lipton caught up in huge pension bribery scandal

Former controller Alan Hevesi and actress Peggy Lipton are both said to have benefitted in the state pension scandal
Former controller Alan Hevesi and actress Peggy Lipton are both said to have benefitted in the state pension scandal

ALBANY - Former Controller Alan Hevesi took $75,000 in luxury trips from an investment banker who admitted paying nearly $1 million in bribes for state pension fund business, sources said.

It's the first time Hevesi was directly linked to the massive pay-to-play scandal that engulfed his office.

Hevesi and former "Mod Squad" actress Peggy Lipton benefited from the "bribes" investor Elliott Broidy made to four top pension fund officials, the sources said yesterday.

In exchange, Broidy's company, Los Angeles-based Markstone Capital Partners, got $250 million in pension fund commitments and collected more than $18 million in management fees.

Attorney General Andrew Cuomo said Broidy covered $75,000 in expenses for "luxury travel" five times to Israel and once to Italy for a "very senior official" in the controller's office.

Cuomo said the official and his family, whom he would not name, received first-class airline seating, hotel suites, a car and driver and even helicopter tours.

Sources told the Daily News the official was Hevesi, who resigned and pleaded guilty to an unrelated felony in 2006.

Cuomo said Broidy hid the payments by submitting false invoices. Broidy, his wife and their associates gave tens of thousands of dollars to Hevesi's campaigns.

Hevesi lawyer Bradley Simon, who has routinely maintained the former controller had done no wrong, had no comment on the latest development.

Two months before resigning in 2006, The News Editorial Board asked Hevesi about his first-class travel to Israel.

He defended it by saying he ran a massive pension system second only to Warren Buffett in investing in Israel.

"It was a great investment opportunity, plus I am a Zionist," he said.

Asked about rules against luxury travel, he said, "I don't know if there are any rules."

Broidy pleaded guilty yesterday in Manhattan Supreme Court to a felony charge of rewarding official misconduct.

Cuomo said Broidy paid $90,000 in rent, expenses and hospital bills to the girlfriend of a senior controller's office official.

He also gave $44,000 to the girlfriend's family, Cuomo said. While he would not name the official, The News has reported it is Jack Chartier, who had a close relationship with Lipton.

Lipton and Chartier could not be reached for comment.

Cuomo said Broidy also gave $300,000 to help finance the movie "Chooch," produced by the brother of Hevesi's chief investment officer David Loglisci.

Another official was paid nearly $400,000 through a sham consulting agreement to a relative of a state official.

A source said the consultant was lobbyist Frank Sanzillo, brother of Hevesi's top assistant Thomas Sanzillo.

Thomas Sanzillo had no comment. His brother could not be reached.

"This is an old-fashioned payoff," Cuomo said.

In some cases, Hevesi's office solicited payments from Broidy while in others he offered them up, said Deputy Attorney General Ellen Biben.

Broidy, who faces up to four years in prison, was released pending sentencing. He has resigned from Markstone.

"Mr. Broidy regrets the actions that brought about this course of events, but is pleased to have resolved this matter ... and will be cooperating in the ongoing investigation," Broidy lawyer Christopher Clark said.

Broidy is the fifth guilty plea in the pension scandal probe.


The Honolulu Advertiser dated November 30th 1941, one week before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

BBC Documentary: Sacrifice at Pearl Harbor

Download RealVideo File (42MB)

"...everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States..." ARMY BOARD, 1944

President Roosevelt (FDR) provoked the attack, knew about it in advance and covered up his failure to warn the Hawaiian commanders. FDR needed the attack to sucker Hitler to declare war, since the public and Congress were overwhelmingly against entering the war in Europe. It was his backdoor to war.

FDR blinded the commanders at Pearl Harbor and set them up by -

  1. denying intelligence to Hawaii (HI)
  2. on Nov 27, misleading the commanders into thinking negotiations with Japan were continuing to prevent them from realizing the war was on
  3. having false information sent to HI about the location of the Japanese carrier fleet.


  • 1904 - The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise attack in undeclared war.
  • 1932 - In The Grand Joint Army Navy Exercises the attacker, Admiral Yarnell, attacked with 152 planes a half-hour before dawn 40 miles NE of Kahuku Point and caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
  • 1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
  • 1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.
  • 7 Oct 1940 - Navy IQ analyst McCollum wrote an 8 point memo on how to force Japan into war with US. Beginning the next day FDR began to put them into effect and all 8 were eventually accomplished.
  • 11 November 1940 - 21 aged British planes destroyed the Italian fleet, including 3 battleships, at their homeport in the harbor of Taranto in Southern Italy by using technically innovative shallow-draft torpedoes.
  • 11 February 1941 - FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at Manila to get into war. Navy Chief Stark objected: "I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested (more forces to Manila) and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6." (Charles Beard PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WAR 1941, p 424)
  • March 1941 - FDR sold munitions and convoyed them to belligerents in Europe -- both acts of war and both violations of international law -- the Lend-Lease Act.
  • 23 Jun 1941 - Advisor Harold Ickes wrote FDR a memo the day after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, "There might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia." FDR was pleased with Admiral Richmond Turner's report read July 22: "It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead promptly to the invasion of Netherland East Indies...it seems certain she would also include military action against the Philippine Islands, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war." On July 24 FDR told the Volunteer Participation Committee, "If we had cut off the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war." The next day FDR froze all Japanese assets in US cutting off their main supply of oil and forcing them into war with the US. Intelligence information was withheld from Hawaii from this point forward.
  • 14 August - At the Atlantic Conference, Churchill noted the "astonishing depth of Roosevelt's intense desire for war." Churchill cabled his cabinet "(FDR) obviously was very determined that they should come in."
  • 18 October - diary entry by Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes: "For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."


  • Purple Code - the top Japanese diplomatic machine cipher which used automatic telephone switches to separately and differently encipher each character sent. It was cracked by the Army Signal Intelligence Service (331 men).
  • J-19 was the main Japanese diplomatic code book. This columnar code was cracked.
  • Coral Machine Cipher or JNA-20 was a simplified version of Purple used by Naval attaches. Only one message deciphered prior to Pearl Harbor has been declassified.
  • JN-25 - The Japanese Fleet's Cryptographic System, a.k.a. 5 number code (Sample). JN stands for Japanese Navy, introduced 1 June 1939. This was a very simple old-type code book system used by the American Army and Navy in 1898 and abandoned in 1917 because it was insecure. Version A has a dictionary of 5,600 numbers, words and phrases, each given as a five figure number. These were super-enciphered by addition to random numbers contained in a second code book. The dictionary was only changed once before PH on Dec 1, 1940, to a slightly larger version B but the random book was changed every 3 to 6 months- last on Aug 1. The Japanese blundered away the code when they introduced JN25-B by continuing to use, for 2 months, random books that had been previously solved by the Allies. That was the equivalent of handing over the JN-25B codebook. It was child's play for the Navy group OP-20-G (738 men whose primary responsibility was Japanese naval codes) to reconstruct the exposed dictionary. We recovered the whole thing immediately - in 1994 the NSA published that JN-25B was completely cracked in December 1940. In January 1941 the US gave Britain two JN-25B code books with keys and techniques for deciphering. The entire Pearl Harbor scheme was laid out in this code. The official US Navy statement on JN-25B is the NAVAL SECURITY GROUP HISTORY TO WORLD WAR II prepared by Captain J. Holtwick in June 1971, page 398: "By 1 December 1941 we had the code solved to a readable extent." Churchill wrote "From the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital Japanese ciphers, and were decoding large numbers of their military and diplomatic telegrams."(GRAND ALLIANCE p 598) Chief of Navy codebreaking Safford reported that during 1941 "The Navy COMINT team did a thorough job on the Japanese Navy with no help from the Army."(SRH-149) The first paragraph of the Congressional Report Exhibit 151 says the US was "currently" (instantly) reading JN-25B and exchanging the "translations" with the British prior to Pearl Harbor.

    In 1979 the NSA released 2,413 JN-25 orders of the 26,581 intercepted by US between Sept 1 and Dec 4, 1941. The NSA says "We know now that they contained important details concerning the existence, organization, objective, and even the whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force." (Parker p 21) Of the over thousand radio messages sent by Tokyo to the attack fleet, only 20 are in the National Archives. All messages to the attack fleet were sent several times, at least one message was sent every odd hour of the day and each had a special serial number. Starting in early November 1941 when the attack fleet assembled and started receiving radio messages, OP-20-G stayed open 24 hours a day and the "First Team" of codebreakers worked on JN-25. In November and early December 1941, OP-20-G spent 85 percent of its effort reading Japanese Navy traffic, 12 percent on Japanese diplomatic traffic and 3 percent on German naval codes. FDR was personally briefed twice a day on JN-25 traffic by his aide, Captain John Beardell, and demanded to see the original raw messages in English. The US Government refuses to identify or declassify any pre-Dec 7, 1941 decrypts of JN-25 on the basis of national security, a half-century after the war.

  • AD or Administrative Code wrongly called Admiralty Code was an old four character transposition code used for personnel matters. No important messages were sent in this weak code. Introduced Nov 1938, it was seldom used after Dec 1940.
  • Magic - the security designation given to all decoded Japanese diplomatic messages. It's hard not to conclude with historians like Charles Bateson that "Magic standing alone points so irresistibly to the Pearl Harbor attack that it is inconceivable anybody could have failed to forecast the Japanese move." The NSA reached the same conclusion in 1955.
  • Ultra - the security designation for military codes.


Warnings do no harm and might do inexpressible good

  • 27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This information was sent to the State Department and Naval Intelligence and to Admiral Kimmel at Hawaii.
  • 31 March 1941 - A Navy report by Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan made war on the US, they would strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with aircraft from a maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had assumed that Japan, on the outbreak of war, would strike the American fleet wherever it was. The fleet was the only threat to Japan's plans. Logically, Japan couldn't engage in any major operation with the American fleet on its flank. The strategic options for the Japanese were not unlimited.
  • 10 July - US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor.
  • July - The US Military Attache in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
  • 10 August 1941, the top British agent, code named "Tricycle", Dusko Popov, told the FBI of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would be soon. The FBI told him that his information was "too precise, too complete to be believed. The questionnaire plus the other information you brought spell out in detail exactly where, when, how, and by whom we are to be attacked. If anything, it sounds like a trap." He also reported that a senior Japanese naval person had gone to Taranto to collect all secret data on the attack there and that it was of utmost importance to them. The info was given to Naval IQ.
  • Early in the Fall, Kilsoo Haan, an agent for the Sino-Korean People's League, told Eric Severeid of CBS that the Korean underground in Korea and Japan had positive proof that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before Christmas. Among other things, one Korean had actually seen the plans. In late October, Haan finally convinced US Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were planning to attack in December or January. Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence and FDR personally.
  • 24 September 1941, the " bomb plot" message in J-19 code from Japan Naval Intelligence to Japan' s consul general in Honolulu requesting grid of exact locations of ships pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots was deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT location of ships in harbor, unless to attack them - it was a dead giveaway. Chief of War Plans Turner and Chief of Naval Operations Stark repeatedly kept it and warnings based on it prepared by Safford and others from being passed to Hawaii. The chief of Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was replaced because he insisted on warning HI. It was lack of information like this that lead to the exoneration of the Hawaii commanders and the blaming of Washington for unpreparedness for the attack by the Army Board and Navy Court. At no time did the Japanese ever ask for a similar bomb plot for any other American military installation. Why the Roosevelt administration allowed flagrant Japanese spying on PH has never been explained, but they blocked 2 Congressional investigations in the fall of 1941 to allow it to continue. The bomb plots were addressed to "Chief of 3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff", marked Secret Intelligence message, and given special serial numbers, so their significance couldn't be missed. There were about 95 ships in port. The text was:
    "Strictly secret.

    "Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
    along the following lines insofar as possible:

    "1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five
    subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you

    "Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
    "Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
    (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
    "Area C. East Loch.
    "Area D. Middle Loch.
    "Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.

    "2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
    you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
    wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If
    possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
    there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)"
  • Simple traffic analysis of the accelerated frequency of messages from various Japanese consuls gave a another identification of war preparations, from Aug-Dec there were 6 messages from Seattle, 18 from Panama, 55 from Manila and 68 from Hawaii.
  • Oct. - Soviet top spy Richard Sorge, the greatest spy in history, informed Kremlin that Pearl Harbor would be attacked within 60 days. Moscow informed him that this was passed to the US. Interestingly, all references to Pearl Harbor in the War Department's copy of Sorge's 32,000 word confession to the Japanese were deleted. NY Daily News, 17 May 1951.
  • 16 Oct. - FDR grossly humiliated Japan's Ambassador and refused to meet with Premier Konoye to engineer the war party, lead by General Tojo, into power in Japan.
  • 1 Nov. - JN-25 Order to continue drills against anchored capital ships to prepare to "ambush and completely destroy the US enemy." The message included references to armor-piercing bombs and 'near surface torpedoes.'
  • 13 Nov. - The German Ambassador to US, Dr. Thomsen an anti-Nazi, told US IQ that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.
  • 14 Nov. - Japanese Merchant Marine was alerted that wartime recognition signals would be in effect Dec 1.
  • 22 Nov. - Tokyo said to Ambassador Nomura in Washington about extending the deadline for negotiations to November 29: "...this time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."
  • CIA Director Allen Dulles told people that US was warned in mid-November that the Japanese Fleet had sailed east past Tokyo Bay and was going to attack Pearl Harbor. CIA FOIA
  • 23 Nov. - JN25 order - "The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-day." (Tokyo time or 8 A.M. Honolulu time)
  • 25 Nov. - British decrypted the Winds setup message sent Nov. 19. The US decoded it Nov. 28. It was a J-19 Code message that there would be an attack and that the signal would come over Radio Tokyo as a weather report - rain meaning war, east (Higashi) meaning US.
  • 25 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary "FDR stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday." FDR asked: "the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."
  • 25 Nov. - Navy Department ordered all US trans-Pacific shipping to take the southern route. PHH 12:317 (PHH = 1946 Congressional Report, vol. 12, page 317) ADM Turner testified "We sent the traffic down to the Torres Straight, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic." PHH 4:1942
  • 25 Nov. - Yamamoto radioed this order in JN-25: " (a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The raid is planned for dawn on X-day -- exact date to be given by later order. (b) Should the negotiations with the US prove successful, the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble. (c) The task force will move out of Hitokappu Wan on the morning of 26 November and advance to the standing-by position on the afternoon of 4 December and speedily complete refueling." ( Order to sail - scan from the PHA Congressional Hearings Report, vol 1 p 180, transcript p 437-8) This was decoded by the British on November 25 and the Dutch on November 27. When it was decoded by the US is a national secret, however, on November 26 Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action.
  • 26 Nov. 3 A.M. - Churchill sent an urgent secret message to FDR, probably containing above message. This message caused the greatest agitation in DC. Of Churchill's voluminous correspondence with FDR, this is the only message that has not been released (on the grounds that it would damage national security). Stark testified that "On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States." C.I.A. Director William Casey, who was in the OSS in 1941, in his book THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HITLER, p 7, wrote "The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii." Washington, in an order of Nov 26 as a result of the "first shot" meeting the day before, ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as practicable." This order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection. In response to Churchill's message, FDR secretly cabled him that afternoon - "Negotiations off. Services expect action within two weeks." Note that the only way FDR could have linked negotiations with service action, let alone have known the timing of the action, was if he had the message to sail. In other words, the only service action contingent on negotiations was Pearl Harbor.
  • 26 Nov. - the "most fateful document " was Hull's ultimatum that Japan must withdraw from Indochina and all China. FDR's Ambassador to Japan called this "The document that touched the button that started the war."
  • 27 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson sent a confused and confusing hostile action possible or DO-DON'T warning. The Navy Court found this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor, rather than toward it. One purpose of the message was to mislead HI into believing negotiations were continuing. The Army which could not do reconnaissance was ordered to and the Navy which could was ordered not to. The Army was ordered on sabotage alert, which specifically precluded attention to outside threat. Navy attention was misdirected 5000 miles from HI. DC repeated, no less than three times as a direct instruction of the President, "The US desires that Japan commit the first overt act Period." It was unusual that FDR directed this warning, a routine matter, to Hawaii which is proof that he knew other warnings were not sent. A simple question--what Japanese "overt act" was FDR expecting at Pearl Harbor? He ordered sabotage prevented and subs couldn't enter, that leaves air attack. The words "overt act" disclose FDR's intent - not just that Japan be allowed to attack but that they inflict damage on the fleet. This FDR order to allow a Japanese attack was aid to the enemy - explicit treason.
  • 29 Nov.- Hull sat in Layfayette Park across from the White House with ace United Press reporter Joe Leib and showed him a message stating that Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7. This could well have been the Nov. 26 message from Churchill. The New York Times in its 12/8/41 PH report on page 13 under the headline "Attack Was Expected" stated the US had known that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked the week before. Perhaps Leib wasn't the only reporter Hull told.
  • 29 Nov. - The FBI embassy tap made an intercept of an uncoded plain-text Japanese telephone conversation in which an Embassy functionary (Kurusu) asked 'Tell me, what zero hour is. Otherwise, I won't be able to carry on diplomacy.' The voice from Tokyo (K. Yamamoto) said softly, 'Well then, I will tell you. Zero hour is December 8 (Tokyo time, ie, December 7 US time) at Pearl Harbor.' (US Navy translation 29 Nov)
  • 30 Nov. US Time (or 1 Dec. Tokyo time) - The Japanese fleet was radioed this Imperial Naval Order (JN-25): "JAPAN, UNDER THE NECESSITY OF HER SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DEFENSE, HAS REACHED A POSITION TO DECLARE WAR ON THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA." (Congress Appendix D, p 415). US ally China also recovered it in plain text from a shot-down Japanese Army plane near Canton that evening. This caused an emergency Imperial Conference because they knew the Chinese would give the information to GB and US. In a related J-19 message the next day, the US translated elaborate instructions from Japan dealing in precise detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the United States"
  • 1 Dec. - Office of Naval Intelligence, ONI, Twelfth Naval District in San Francisco found the missing Japanese fleet by correlating reports from the four wireless news services and several shipping companies that they were getting strange signals west of Hawaii. The Soviet Union also knew the exact location of the Japanese fleet because they asked the Japanese in advance to let one of their ships pass (Layton p 261). This info was most likely given to them by US because Sorge's spy ring was rolled up November 14. All long-range PBY patrols from the Aleutians were ordered stopped on Dec 6 to prevent contact.
  • 1 Dec. - Foreign Minister Togo cabled Washington Ambassador Nomura to continue negotiations "to prevent the U.S. from becoming unduly suspicious."
  • 1 Dec. - The tanker Shiriya, which had been added to the Striking Force in an order intercepted Nov 14, radioed "proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20 E. Expect to arrive at that point on 3 December." (near HI) The fact that this message is in the National Archives destroys the myth that the attack fleet maintained radio silence. They were not ordered to (Order 820). Serial numbers prove that the Striking Force sent over 663 radio messages between Nov 16 and Dec 7 or about 1 per hour. The NSA has not released any raw intercepts because the headers would prove that the Striking Force did not maintain radio silence. On Nov 29 the Hiyei sent one message to the Commander of the 3rd fleet; on Nov 30 the Akagi sent several messages to its tankers - see page 474 of the Hewitt Report. Stinnett in DAY OF DECEIT (p 209) found over 100 messages from the Striking Force in the National Archives. All Direction Finding reports from HI have been crudely cut out. Reports from Dec 5 show messages sent from the Striking Force picked up by Station Cast, P.I.
  • From traffic analysis, HI reported that the carrier force was at sea and in the North. THE MOST AMAZING FACT is that in reply to that report, MacArthur's command sent a series of three messages, Nov 26, 29, Dec 2, to HI lying about the location of the carrier fleet - saying it was in the South China Sea. This false information, which the NSA calls inexplicable, was the true reason that HI was caught unawares. Duane Whitlock, who is still alive in Iowa, sent those messages.
  • There were a large number of other messages that gave the location of the Striking Force by alluding to the Aleutians, the North Pacific and various weather systems near HI.
  • 1 Dec. - FDR cut short his scheduled ten day vacation after 1 day to meet with Hull and Stark. The result of this meeting was reported on 2 Dec. by the Washington Post: "President Roosevelt yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and military moves relating to Japan." This politically damaging move was necessary to prevent the mutiny of conspirators.
  • 1 Dec. 3:30 P.M. FDR read Foreign Minister Togo's message to his ambassador to Germany: "Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger between Japan & Anglo-Saxon nations through some clash of arms, add that the time of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This was in response to extreme German pressure on November 29 for Japan to strike the US and promises to join with Japan in war against the US. The second of its three parts has never been released. The message says it contains the plan of campaign. This is 1 of only 3 known DIPLOMATIC intercepts that specified PH as target. It was so interesting, FDR kept a copy.
  • 2 Dec. 2200 Tokyo time- Here is a typical JN-25 ships-in-harbor report sent to attack fleet, words in parenthesis were in the original: "Striking Force telegram No. 994. Two battleships (Oklahoma, Nevada), 1 aircraft carrier (Enterprise) 2 heavy cruisers, 12 destroyers sailed. The force that sailed on 22 November returned to port. Ships at anchor Pearl Harbor p.m. 28 November were 6 battleships (2 Maryland class, 2 California class, 2 Pennsylvania class), 1 aircraft carrier (Lexington), 9 heavy cruisers (5 San Francisco class, 3 Chicago class, 1 Salt Lake class), 5 light cruisers (4 Honolulu class, 1 Omaha class)"
  • 2 Dec. - Commander of the Combined Imperial Fleet Yamamoto radioed the attack fleet in plain (uncoded) Japanese Climb Niitakayama 1208 (Dec 8 Japanese time, Dec 7 our time). Thus the US knew EXACTLY when the war would start. Mount Niitaka was the highest mountain in the Japanese Empire - 13,113 feet.
  • 2 Dec. - General Hein Ter Poorten, the commander of the Netherlands East Indies Army gave the Winds setup message to the US War Department. The Australians had a center in Melbourne and the Chinese also broke JN-25. A Dutch sub had visually tracked the attack fleet to the Kurile Islands in early November and this info was passed to DC, but DC did not give it to HI. The intercepts the Dutch gave the US are still classified in RG 38, Box 792.
  • 2 Dec - Japanese order No. 902 specified that old JN-25 additive tables version 7 would continue to be used alongside version 8 when the latter was introduced on December 4. This means the US read all messages to the Striking Force through the attack.
  • 4 Dec. - In the early hours, Ralph Briggs at the Navy's East Coast Intercept station, received the "East Winds, Rain" message, the Winds Execute, which meant war. He put it on the TWX circuit immediately and called his commander. This message was deleted from the files. One of the main coverups of Pearl Harbor was to make this message disappear. Japanese Dispatch # 7001. In response to the Winds Execute, the Office of US Naval IQ had all Far Eastern stations (Hawaii not informed) destroy their codes and classified documents including the Tokyo Embassy.
  • 4 Dec. - The Dutch invoked the ADB joint defense agreement when the Japanese crossed the magic line of 100 East and 10 North. The U.S. was at war with Japan 3 days before they were at war with us.
  • 4 Dec. - General Ter Poorten sent all the details of the Winds Execute command to Colonel Weijerman, the Dutch military attache' in Washington to pass on to the highest military circles. Weijerman personally gave it to Marshall, Chief of Staff of the War Department.
  • 4 Dec - US General Thorpe at Java sent four messages warning of the PH attack. DC ordered him to stop sending warnings.
  • 5 Dec. - All Japanese international shipping had returned to home port.
  • 5 December - In the morning FDR dictated a letter to Wendell Wilkie for the Australian Prime Minister, "There is always the Japanese to consider. The situation is definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment...Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matters."
  • 5 Dec. - At a Cabinet meeting, Secretary of the Navy Knox said, "Well, you know Mr. President, we know where the Japanese fleet is?" "Yes, I know" said FDR. " I think we ought to tell everybody just how ticklish the situation is. We have information as Knox just mentioned...Well, you tell them what it is, Frank." Knox became very excited and said, "Well, we have very secret information that the Japanese fleet is out at sea. Our information is..." and then a scowling FDR cut him off. (Infamy, Toland, 1982, ch 14 sec 5)
  • 5 Dec. - Washington Star reporter Constantine Brown quotes a friend in his book The Coming of the Whirlwind p 291, "This is it! The Japs are ready to attack. We've broken their code, and we've read their ORDERS."
  • 5 Dec. - Lt. Howard Brown of Station Cast in the Philippines received urgent request from Washington to listen for a short message from Tokyo which ended with the English word "stop". He heard the message at 11:30 PM Hawaiian time Dec 6. This is the Hidden Word Code set up in a message of November 27 (e.g. in code, Roosevelt=Miss Kimiko). The message was: "Relations between Japan and the following countries are on the brink of catastrophe: Britain and the United States."
  • 6 December - This 18 November J19 message was translated by the Army:
    "1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my No.219 on that day. Area A -- A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. Area C -- 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
    2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in harbor. The carrier Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS'. 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D.
    3. At 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor..." Of course this information was not passed to HI.
  • 6 Dec. - A Dec 2 request from Tokyo to HI for information about the absence of barrage balloons, anti-torpedo nets and air recon was translated by the Army.
  • 6 Dec. - at 9:30 P.M FDR read the first 13 parts of the decoded Japanese diplomatic declaration of war and said "This means war." What kind of President would do nothing? When he returned to his 34 dinner guests he said, "The war starts tomorrow."
  • 6 Dec. - the war cabinet: FDR, top advisor Hopkins, Stimson, Marshall, Secretary of the Navy Knox, with aides John McCrea and Frank Beatty "deliberately sat through the night of 6 December 1941 waiting for the Japs to strike." (Infamy ch 16 sec 2)
  • 7 December - A message from the Japanese Consul in Budapest to Tokyo:
    "On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th." The communique was the Dec 5th War Alert from the British Admiralty. It has disappeared. This triple priority alert was delivered to FDR personally. The Mid-East British Air Marshall told Col. Bonner Fellers on Saturday that he had received a secret signal that America was coming into the war in 24 hours. Churchill summarized the message in GRAND ALLIANCE page 601 as listing the two fleets attacking British targets and "Other Japanese fleets...also at sea on other tasks." There only were three other fleets- for Guam, the Philippines and HI. 2 paragraphs of the alert, British targets only, are printed in AT DAWN WE SLEPT, Prange, p 464. There is no innocent purpose for our government to hide this document.
  • 7 December 1941 very early Washington time, there were two Marines, an emergency special detail, stationed outside the Japanese Naval Attache's door. 9:30 AM Aides begged Stark to send a warning to Hawaii. He did not. 10 AM FDR read the 14th part, 11 A.M. FDR read the 15th part setting the time for the declaration of war to be delivered to the State Department at 1 PM, about dawn Pearl Harbor time, and did nothing. Navy Secretary Knox was given the 15th part at 11:15 A.M. with this note from the Office of Naval IQ: "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." Naval IQ also transmitted this prediction to Hull and about 8 others, including the White House (PHH 36:532). At 10:30 AM Bratton informed Marshall that he had a most important message (the 15th part) and would bring it to Marshall's quarters but Marshall said he would take it at his office. At 11:25 Marshall reached his office according to Bratton. Marshall testified that he had been riding horses that morning but he was contradicted by Harrison, McCollum, and Deane. Marshall who had read the first 13 parts by 10 PM the prior night, perjured himself by denying that he had even received them. Marshall, in the face of his aides' urgent supplications that he warn Hawaii, made strange delays including reading and re-reading all of the 10 minute long 14 Part Message (and some parts several times) which took an hour and refused to use the scrambler phone on his desk, refused to send a warning by the fast, more secure Navy system but sent Bratton three times to inquire how long it would take to send his watered down warning - when informed it would take 30 or 40 minutes by Army radio, he was satisfied (that meant he had delayed enough so the warning wouldn't reach Pearl Harbor until after the 1 PM Washington time deadline). The warning was in fact sent commercial without priority identification and arrived 6 hours late. This message reached all other addressees, like the Philippines and Canal Zone, in a timely manner.
  • 7 December - 7:55 A.M. Hawaii time AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL.
  • 7 December - 1:50 P.M. Washington time. Harry Hopkins, who was the only person with FDR when he received the news of the attack by telephone from Knox, wrote that FDR was unsurprised and expressed "great relief." Eleanor Roosevelt wrote about December 7th in This I Remember p 233, that FDR became "in a way more serene." In the NY Times Magazine of October 8, 1944 she wrote: "December 7 was...far from the shock it proved to the country in general. We had expected something of the sort for a long time."
  • 7 December - 3:00 PM "The (war cabinet) conference met in not too tense an atmosphere because I think that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy was Hitler...and that Japan had given us an opportunity." Harry Hopkins (top KGB agent and FDR's alter ego), Dec. 7 Memo (Roosevelt and Hopkins R Sherwood, p. 431)
  • 7 December - 9 hours later, MacArthur's entire air force was caught by surprise and wiped out in the Philippines. His reaction to the news of Pearl Harbor was quite unusual - he locked himself in his room all morning and refused to meet with his air commander General Brereton, and refused to attack Japanese forces on Formosa even under orders from the War Department. MacArthur gave three conflicting orders that ensured the planes were on the ground most of the morning. MacArthur used radar tracking of the Japanese planes at 140, 100, 80, 60, down to 20 miles to time his final order and ensure his planes were on the ground. Strategically, the destruction of half of all US heavy bombers in the world was more important than naval damage in Pearl Harbor. Either MacArthur had committed the greatest blunder in military history or he was under orders to allow his forces to be destroyed. If it were the greatest blunder in history, it is remarkable how he escaped any reprimand, kept his command and got his fourth star and Congressional Medal of Honor shortly later. Prange argued, "How could the President ensure a successful Japanese attack unless he confided in the commanders and persuaded them to allow the enemy to proceed unhindered?"
  • 7 December - 8:30 PM, FDR said to his cabinet, "We have reason to believe that the Germans have told the Japanese that if Japan declares war, they will too. In other words, a declaration of war by Japan automatically brings..." at which point he was interrupted, but his expectation and focus is clear. Mrs. Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, observed later about FDR: "I had a deep emotional feeling that something was wrong, that this situation was not all it appeared to be." Mrs. Perkins was obsessed by Roosevelt's strange reactions that night and remarked particularly on the expression he had:" In other words, there have been times when I associated that expression with a kind of evasiveness."
  • FDR met with CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow at midnight. Murrow, who had seen many statesmen in crises, was surprised at FDR's calm reaction. After chatting about London, they reviewed the latest news from PH and then FDR tested Murrow's news instincts with these 2 bizarre giveaway questions: "Did this surprise you?" Murrow said yes. FDR: "Maybe you think it didn't surprise us?" FDR gave the impression that the attack itself was not unwelcome. This is the same high-strung FDR that got polio when convicted of perjury; the same FDR that was bedridden for a month when he learned Russia was to be attacked; the same FDR who couldn't eat or drink when he got the Japanese order to sail.
  • 8 December - In a conversation with his speech writer Rosenman, FDR "emphasized that Hitler was still the first target, but he feared that a great many Americans would insist that we make the war in the Pacific at least equally important with the war against Hitler."
  • Later, Jonathan Daniels, administrative assistant and press secretary to FDR said, "The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be...But the risks paid off; even the loss was worth the price..."
  • FDR reminisced with Stalin at Tehran on November 30, 1943, saying "if the Japanese had not attacked the US he doubted very much if it would have been possible to send any American forces to Europe." Compare this statement with what FDR said at the Atlantic Conference 4 months before Pearl: "Everything was to be done to force an 'incident' to justify hostilities." Given that a Japanese attack was the only possible incident, then FDR had said he would do it.

Information Known in Washington and Hawaii

October 9-December 7, 1941

Oct. 9"Bombplot" messageX

Nov. 26-28"Winds" setup messageXX [1]
Nov. 26Location of carriersX

Dec. 1Japanese declaration of warX

Dec. 2-6Code destructionX [2]XX
Dec. 4"Winds execute" messageX
X [3]
Dec. 4US at war with Japan via ADBX

Dec. 5British Admiralty AlertX

Dec. 6-7"14 Part" messageX

Dec. 7"One o'clock" messageX

[1] Admiral Kimmel learned of the "winds" code in a Nov. 28th dispatch to him from the US Asiatic Fleet. JCC, p. 470.

[2] DC informed HI that codes were being burned world-wide so when they learned the local consulate burned codes they would not go on alert.

[3] General Short was given the Winds Execute by British IQ.

Note that none of the 3 diplomatic messages or the many naval messages identifying Pearl as the target were forwarded (not to mention HUMINT). Only 5 of the 74 Navy IQ packets delivered to FDR in the 2 weeks before Dec 7 can be found.


Two and only two courts of law have decided the issue of whether FDR and Washington or the commanders in Hawaii were responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster. Both the Navy Court and the Army Board found Washington guilty (in 1944).

  • NAVY Court of Inquiry
  • !!!Top Secret ARMY Board Report!!! (30K), Oct, 1944, "Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War, and Navy Departments in all of their Top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack. " In response to this report, Marshall offered his resignation - the sign of a guilty conscience. Marshall testified at the MacArthur hearings that he considered loyalty to his chief superior to loyalty to his country.