Wolf
Richter www.testosteronepit.com www.amazon.com/author/wolfrichter
When the not particularly colorful Jens
Weidmann, President of the emasculated Bundesbank and member of the
ECB’s Governing Council, speaks, central bankers and money printers
worldwide stuff wax into their ears.
“Caution
– the euro crisis is far from over.”
Yup,
that’s what he dared to tell the WirtschaftsWoche,
though central bankers, politicians, and Eurocrats had declared the
crisis over and done with a year ago. Wax being stuffed into ears
could be heard around the world. He apparently hadn’t yet noticed
that economic growth and prosperity for all had washed over the
Eurozone, even if no one in the real economy could actually see
it. Nevertheless, financial markets had been soaring.
The crisis “is currently less noticeable in
the financial markets than a year ago,” he said, his eyes riveted
on them. That’s what counts, even for him. And progress has been
made. He credited tepid economic reforms in the crisis countries,
fiscal bailout mechanisms, and “probably” also ECB President
Mario Draghi’s announcement last year that the ECB would buy
unlimited sovereign bonds, as Weidmann said, “of crisis countries
under certain conditions if necessary.”
A
grudging admission. Draghi’s infamous “whatever it takes” was
the only thing
that kept the debt crisis from blowing up the Eurozone. The mere
threat of printing enough money to monetize the entire debt and all
deficits did the trick. Printing money will always solve a debt
crisis by bailing out bondholders, regardless of the costs to
everyone else. “But,” he said, “it might take many years until
the causes of the crisis are actually removed.”
Then
he committed central-bank heresy.
He warned of low interest rates! There was a
danger that the government and the private sector would get used to
the cheap money, he said; it “keeps banks and companies that don’t
have viable businesses alive.” He should be excommunicated from the
central banking cartel for this transgression.
There was the danger that the current ultra-low
interest rates were linked to “risks and side effects that increase
with the duration of the loose monetary policy.” These ultra-low
rates also deprived the central bank of its normal tools. Which put
the ECB in a conundrum: “Our message is that the ECB is ready to
act if necessary,” he said. “Yet the traditional instruments at
the zero-interest-rate boundary are less effective.”
And the ultimate weapon against savers –
those that haven’t been destroyed yet – negative deposit rates?
They’ve been bandied about as solution to the economic quagmire.
Banks would pay the ECB to store their money there. It would
annihilate any interest that banks pay depositors. Destroying savers
for the benefit of someone else is always good. Alas, rather than
stimulate the economy, negative deposit rates could have the
“opposite of the desired effect,” he said. Banks would pass on
the costs associated with negative deposit rates to borrowers by
raising the interest rates on loans. Instead of using cheap central
bank money to step up lending to businesses and private households,
banks would make loans more expensive.
Then he honed in like a heat-seeking missile on
the voices clamoring for the ECB to hand banks another round of
nearly free loans, similar to the previous Long-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTRO). It had done absolutely zero for the economy in the
Eurozone. Banks simply took that nearly free money and plowed it into
high-yielding government bonds from crisis countries. It was a total
no-brainer. And they got rich off the difference in yield without
bending a finger. In the process, they loaded up their balance sheets
with iffy Spanish and Italian government debt – while both
countries sank deeper into their economic morass.
So this time, the loans would be designed to
get banks to lend to certain businesses in certain sectors in certain
crisis countries. That was the latest Eurocratic solution. Some wise
central bankers would decide where exactly the money that they
printed should go. They’d be called upon to “finely control
regional or sectorial bank lending,” he said. But….
“That
ends quickly in planned-economy approaches.”
A harsh warning. “Central banks should not
interfere with the business decisions of banks to steer loans to
certain regions or to certain borrowers,” Weidmann said. But then
he returned to being a central banker whose job it was to give free
money to the banks that are part of the cartel that he and his
colleagues were holding together. Instead of opposing that more money
is handed out, he suggested that banks should simply be discouraged
from buying sovereign bonds through “pricing that makes such carry
trades unattractive.”
And for the Eurozone as a whole, he saw no risk
of deflation, unlike those who whined that not enough money was being
printed. Instead, he saw inflation between 1% and 1.5%. It would be
“low, but positive.” Longer-term, inflation expectations would be
around 2%. Even if prices were to drop in Southern Europe, it would
be “part of the adjustment to make these countries competitive
again.” He didn’t see “a self-reinforcing and
expectation-driven deflation” that could “act to exacerbate the
crisis.”
But even he – like all central bankers –
doesn’t waste his breath on an interview unless it’s to jawbone
politicians and other players into doing what he wants them to do,
drive consumers to spend more money, and manipulate the financial
markets. Because manipulation is what central banks do, either by
wagging their tongues or by handing out money.
Suddenly,
there’s a solution to France’s economic crisis. Unlike the
cacophonous clamor from the far right to drop the euro, this one was
attractively presented with graphs and in terms that even a French
politician might understand. And it’s not contaminated by
partisanship. Read…. French
Megabank: “Germany Should Leave The Eurozone”
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