A few weeks ago I was invited to comment on what I felt the change in
China’s government and the Communist Party leadership will mean for
the future of China and for the UN. (1) I am not an expert on China, but
I have by now had the experience of observing China’s activity at the
UN and particularly in the Security Council for almost seven years.
What I have observed recently, is that in some areas, like the Syrian
conflict, China continues to insist on its long standing principle to
support negotiations and to work toward a political settlement of the
conflict. But in other areas, particularly the situation with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) China has seemed to be
subordinating its emphasis on the peaceful settlement of conflicts to
go along with the coercive actions proposed by the US government against
the DPRK. (2)
One recent example occurred when the DPRK launched a satellite in
December 2012. Some members of the Security Council complained that this
was a violation of a resolution forbidding the DPRK from launching a
ballistic missile. Though both a satellite launch and a ballistic
missile launch use a rocket to do the launch, these forms of launches
are not the same.
As Professor Bruce Cumings, the noted historian on the subject of the
Korean Peninsula, explained in a talk he gave at Columbia University
on March 2, 2013 (3):
1. A ballistic missile needs a reentry shield
2. A ballistic missile has to have targeting on reentry
3. A ballistic missile has to have a warhead.
The satellite launch by the DPRK did not have these three
characteristics. As such, the satellite launch was significantly
different from a ballistic missile launch.
The DPRK submitted statements to the Security Council and to General
Assembly meetings explaining that there is an international treaty
recognizing all nations right to the peaceful use of space. (4) The
DPRK is a signatory of that treaty. The DPRK notes that there have been
many satellite launches but only their satellite launch is classified as
that of the launch of a ballistic missile. This is an indication, they
explain, of the hostility of the US toward the DPRK.
In this situation neither China nor any other member of the Security
Council asked that the DPRK be invited to present its view of this
conflict to the Security Council members as provided for in Article 31
of the UN Charter. Instead the Security Council expanded the sanctions
it has imposed on the DPRK by issuing a new resolution against the
DPRK, Resolution 2087( S/RES/2087(2013)), on January 22.
Instead of the members of the Security Council providing a process to
engage the DPRK in negotiations, as China and other members of the
Security Council had done in a few instances in the past, (5) all the
members of the Security Council went along with the US government
program of coercion and punishment of the DPRK.
The DPRK has explained that in response to hostile actions by the US
and the use of the Security Council to support hostile action by the US,
the DPRK needs to develop its nuclear defense capability. On February
12, 2013, the DPRK conducted its third nuclear test. The Security
Council then issued Resolution 2094( S/Res/2094(2013)) on March 7
imposing additional sanctions on the DPRK, including a set of financial
sanctions which are intended to reimpose substantial financial hardship
on the DPRK. These financial sanctions are part of the focus of
Resolution 2094.
These sanctions, journalists were told, were negotiated by the US
and China and then accepted by the other 13 members of the Security
Council. This is a process similar to that which was used in creating
Resolution 2087 punishing the DPRK for launching a satellite.
There is prior experience with what the US puts forward as its use of
financial sanctions against the DPRK, which has been called coercive
diplomacy. It is significant to recognize that the imposition of such US
financial sanctions against the DPRK preceded the first nuclear test
undertaken by the DPRK. In September 2005, the US government used a
little known provision of the US Patriot Act, Section 311 to blacklist a
bank, the Banco Delta Asia, because the DPRK had $25 million of its
funds in the bank. This resulted in the funds of this bank being frozen
and the DPRK losing access to the funds in its account for two years.
These financial sanctions were imposed in a such a manner that they
represented a threat that any bank doing business with the DPRK would be
vulnerable to similar sanctions, effectively denying the DPRK access to
the international banking system. (6)
Prior to the imposition of these financial sanctions against the DPRK
by the US, the DPRK had not tested any nuclear device. And it was only
after the DPRK carried out a nuclear test that the US State Department
became willing to negotiate about ending these financial sanctions.
So the US blacklisting of the Banco Delta Asia, an action taken by
the US Treasury Department against the DPRK, was the Godfather of the
DPRK’s determination to develop its nuclear capability. There are
present and past US government officials, however, who erroneously
claim that the Banco Delta Asia sanctions were effective in stopping the
DPRK’s nuclear program.(7) The opposite is the reality. The US
financial sanctions against the DPRK were one of the significant
factors which the DPRK cites which convinced them of the need for a
nuclear weapon as a defense against such US hostility.
Hence the financial sanctions wielded by powerful nations are the
thrust to spread nuclear proliferation not a means to contain
proliferation. The focus on the form of financial sanctions in
Resolution 2094 demonstrates the failure of the UN Security Council to
learn from past experience. The DPRK has documented how it has been the
victim of a hostile policy on the part of the US since its origin as a
result of the US imposed division of Korea after WWII.(8)
Over 60 years ago, the US artificially divided Korea, a nation which
prior to this division had a history of over 1000 years as a single
nation. After WWII, Korea was divided into two states using a US
manipulated UN General Assembly process in 1948 to consolidate the
division.(9) That division continues until today .
Under the Patriot Act Section 311 provision used to justify the
blacklisting of the Banco Delta Asia bank, a bank in Macao, China, the
US government had no obligation to present evidence to back up its
claims. But in documents submitted to the US government, Stanley Au, the
chief stockholder of the Banco Delta Asia, effectively demonstrated
that the claims presented by the US government against his bank were
fallacious.(10)
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the action taken
against the Banco Delta Asia has been described in testimony presented
at US government hearings, as a politically motivated action targeting
China. According to one of the former government officials who helped to
plan this action, the Banco Delta Asia was intended as a “symbolic
target.” Describing this action at one of several hearings discussing
the blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia, David Asher said (11):
“(T)here’s an old saying in Chinese, ‘You kill the chicken to scare
the monkeys’. We didn’t go out and cite a multitude a Chinese financial
institutions that have been publicly identified as working with North
Korea over the years….We did need to designate one small one though, and
that one small one sent a message to all the other ones….”
Asher explained that the purpose of the action by the US government
against the Banco Delta Asia was to target North Korea and its access to
the international banking system. An even more important purpose for
the US government officials planning this action, he clarifies, was to
issue a threat to the Chinese banking system.
The imposition of similar financial sanctions by the UN Security
Council in Resolution 2094 demonstrates its surrender to US pressure to
create a resolution based on illegitimate processes previously
undertaken by the US government. The US government action against the
Banco Delta Asia in 2005 was an early foray into creating a system of
punishment that its advocates falsely claim was effective to stem
proliferation. But in reality, the opposite is the case. The
blacklisting of the Banco Delta Asia represented an abusive use of the
international finance system against a victim nation.
Financial sanctions as imposed on nations like the DPRK not only harm
that nation and its people, but they also end up creating havoc in the
international financial system. The international financial system was
being used as a political weapon, rather than being protected so that
its integrity could be maintained.
With the US Treasury Department blacklisting the Banco Delta Asia, it
was not only the DPRK that lost access to its funds, but also private
bank account holders at the bank had their funds frozen.
After the US Treasury Department actions against the DPRK in 2005,
only one mainstream US media organization, the McClatchy Newspapers
carried stories investigating the actions by the US Treasury Department
against the Banco Delta Asia. Also a blog called China Matters and
several other online publications like OhmyNews International, then an
English edition of the Korean online publication OhmyNews, carried
articles which helped to expose the US Treasury Department’s false
claims and the support of these US government actions by the mainstream
US media.
The acquiescence by UN Security Council members to sanctions designed
by the US against a smaller nation like the DPRK, both in 2006 when the
Security Council passed Resolution 1718 condemning the DPRK, and more
recently when the Security Council passed Resolution 2094 supporting
similar sanctions, demonstrates the need for a vibrant watchdog media
and for netizens who will monitor what is being done by the Security
Council. It is important to have a netizen media that will probe what is
behind the actions taken by the Security Council and what the real
effects of such actions are on the peoples and nations that such
sanctions target.
The example of the US blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia demonstrates
that the use of financial sanctions by nuclear powers like the US
against small nations like the DPRK will not stop nuclear proliferation.
Instead, it will serve to convince small nations that they need a means
to protect themselves against abuse by powerful countries like the US
and UN Security Council actions supporting such abuse. It will also
hasten efforts by other nations to create an alternative architecture to
the current US dominance of the international financial and banking
systems.
Notes
1. A shortened and edited version of an article written in response
to the request appeared in a Chinese translation in the Hong Kong
Commercial Daily.
An html version: http://www.hkcd.com.hk/content/2013-03/11/content_3159378.htm
A pdf version: http://www.hkcd.com.hk/pdf/201303/0311/HA05311CGCC.Pdf
2. See Ronda Hauben, “US Proposed UN Security Council Resolution Against DPRK Can Only Increase Tension on the Korean Peninsula”
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/03/06/us-proposed-unsc-resolution-against-dprk/
3. See Bruce Cumings, “The Fruits of Engagement with North Korea,
1994—2008”, University of Chicago, talk given at Unify Korea Common
Ground Conference, Korea Art Forum, Columbia University, March 2, 2013.
4. See for example, the Statement by Kim Yong Song, on Agenda item
“Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations
and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization”, New York,
February 19, 2013, p. 3.
5. Ronda Hauben, ”Two Precedents for UN Security Council Action to Calm Tension in the Korean Peninsula.”
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/03/04/two-precedents-unsc-korean-peninsula
6. Ronda Hauben, “North Korea’s 25 Million and Banco Delta Asia”
http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?no=351525&rel_no=1
“Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the policy aimed at targeting China as well as North Korea?”
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=362192&rel_no=1
7. Hearing, US House of Representatives, March 5, 2013, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. The testimony of the three witnesses, and
the Chairman demonstrate that there are those making the false claim
that the blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia was an effective way to stop
proliferation.
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hearing-north-korea%E2%80%99s-criminal-activities-financing-regime
8. KCNA, “DPRK Terms U.S. Hostile Policy Main Obstacle in Resolving
Nuclear Issue”, Memorandum by the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, August. 31, 2012. Also submitted by the DPRK
to the Security Council to be listed as an official UN document.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201208/news31/20120831-21ee.html
9. See the article by Jay Hauben, “People’s Republic of Jeju Island 1945-1946″
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/jeju/Jeju_Island_1945-1946.doc
A version of the article appears in PEAR, Yonsei Journal of
International Studies, Volume 3, Issue 2, Fall/Winter 2011, pp. 277-284
http://sinonk.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/people_s-republic-of-jeju-island-1945-1946.pdf
10. China Hand, “Stanley Au Makes His Case for Banco Delta Asia, China Matters”, May 15, 2007
http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-his-case-for-banco.html
11. US Government, “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and its role in addressing
the nuclear and missile situations in both nations,” Hearing before the
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 109th Congress,
November 2006, p. 115-116.
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/sept_14/06_09_14_trans.pdf
See also China Matters, “David Asher’s Dead End”
http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-end.html
“Banco Delta was a symbolic target. We were trying to kill the
chicken to scare the monkeys. And the monkeys were big Chinese banks
doing business in North Korea…and we’re not talking about tens of
millions, we’re talking hundreds of millions.” David Asher, oral
testimony, April 18, 2007
Asher’s opening statement and subsequent responses taken from House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
April 18, 2007
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