Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador Saudi ambassador to the United States once called the US-Saudi relationship a "Catholic marriage". When the remark was uttered in the 1990s it was a view common in both Riyadh and Washington. The US-Saudi alliance had just capped two major
victories, one over Saddam's Iraq and the other over the Soviets in Afghanistan.
That was an era of good feeling, so much so that American officials took to calling the Saudi envoy "Bandar the Magnificent". However as the past decade has shown in glaring detail, it was not a lasting sentiment. The September 11 attacks can be easily identified as the demarcating line in the US-Saudi relationship. Following the identification of 15 of the 19 hijackers, and the mastermind Osama bin Laden, as Saudi nationals, a hitherto unheard of level of US attention was turned on the sensitive topics of Saudi society and domestic political reform.
The friction resulting from this was compounded by the expanding "war on terror", disagreements over Palestinian policy, and finally and perhaps most severely the decision by the George W Bush administration to invade Iraq. It was the culmination of these factors that led an exasperated Prince Saud al-Faisal to amend his brothers remarks to state that the US-Saudi relationship was not a "Catholic marriage" but in fact a "Muslim marriage".
The warning was remarkably clear, as Islam allows for up to four marriages the US was to be on notice that Saudi Arabia could and would pursue other major power relationships. Whither to go? Rapprochement with Russia was swiftly discounted as Russia took up positions behind the Tehran-Damascus axis, while Europe was both too close to the United States and too weak. The logical conclusion led Saudi envoys to Beijing. As a mutually autocratic state with little interest in Saudi domestic reforms and a power on the rise, China was an obvious and attractive option to pursue.
Saudi Arabia was on familiar ground in China. The kingdom's relationship with Beijing dated back to the 1980s, when Beijing acted as a clearinghouse for arms headed for Afghanistan and as an increasingly hungry customer for Saudi crude. The first signs that a Sino-Saudi relationship could bear strategic fruit came in 1988 when Saudi Arabia purchased 36 CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles, and nine launchers.
The sale was extremely controversial as the missiles have little utility as conventional weapons and are geared towards use as weapons of mass destruction platforms. Upon discovery of the sale the Bush administration began a series of frantic calls to Riyadh to try and dissuade the Saudi's from the "reckless" arms adventure. American worries fell on deaf ears, and aside from assurances that Saudi Arabia had no nuclear intentions, their concerns were rejected. Thus the appealing prospect of an unfussy Chinese ally was piqued in Riyadh.
Though the relationship had grown in the 1990s with the signing of bilateral trade agreements, ministerial exchanges, and increasing trade volume, the real shift began in 2006. In a remarkable turnaround from the days when Chinese communists could not even step foot in the kingdom, King Abdullah made an official state visit to Beijing.
One of the major issues highlighted, likely to the discomfiture of Washington, was the maintenance of regional peace and energy security, a sphere normally reserved to the US-Saudi relationship. The trip was soon reciprocated with a state visit to Riyadh by Chinese President Hu Jintao, cementing the shift in the Sino-Saudi relationship.
In early 2011, Saudi Arabia was faced with the growing tremors of the Arab Spring and an increasingly aggressive Iran on their strategic periphery. In quick succession Saudi Arabia faced the collapse of Hosni Mubarak's regime in Egypt, the disintegration of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime in Yemen, and the prospect of an overthrow of the al-Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain.
The kingdom's first instinct was to try to contain the damage and stop the spread of democratic contagion. However when it turned to the United States for assistance, or at least acquiescence, it found an unsympathetic ear. The US opposed Saudi attempts to buttress the Mubarak regime, with ties fraying so much that Riyadh offered to match US aid dollar for dollar if it was cut.
Following the collapse of Mubarak's regime and the lack of support from the US, the Saudi's blatantly ignored the United States and sent troops into Bahrain to stymie street protests and fortify a critical ally.
There is much evidence that Riyadh has been scarred by this experience. When Saudi Arabia felt like it needed US support the most, it's liberal concerns inhibited its ability to act and in many cases set the US in opposition to the Kingdom. The Saudi's canceled a series of planned visits by US diplomats in mid-February, and rebuffed attempts to set up meetings in March, only in April did the Saudi's agree to a meeting with then US defense secretary Robert Gates.
The meeting was chilly by all accounts, and Washington has been endeavoring ever since to repair the ruptures in the relationship. However at the same time that Washington was trying to get its diplomats through the doors of the palace, Saudi Arabia had dispatched its own envoys to China.
In a tag team maneuver King Abdullah sent long time American ambassador Prince Bandar and his successor Prince Turki al-Faisal on a series of meetings to Beijing. The result has been a steady series of energy, trade, and security agreements. As recently as a month ago Saudi Arabia and China inked a major civil nuclear cooperation agreement that has heralded much speculation about the future of Saudi nuclear ambitions and the extent of Chinese cooperation.
While in the backdrop of the escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf and increasing economic pressure on Iran, the Saudi's have been engaging in a mini-version of shuttle diplomacy with China. Earlier this month the Saudi's assured Asian oil partners, but China in particular, that Saudi Arabia's reserve production capacity was more than enough to cover an Iranian shortfall. The goal being to leverage China from its protective stance over Iran, and join in the oil embargo or at least not impede further action by the United Nations Security Council.
The flowering of the Sino-Saudi relationship has been remarkable both for its rapidity and the depth of some its connections. However, there are significant stumbling blocks for the development of a permanent alliance, and questions over what the goals of the relationship are. At the end of the day Saudi Arabia is still incredibly dependent upon the United States and the Western powers for its security guarantee.
This is easily evidenced by the quantity of US bases in the region, the willingness of the US to deploy significant assets to the Gulf, and of course the nearly US$60 billion arms deal announced late last year. There is also a relative confluence of policy aims between Saudi Arabia and the United States over Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, something not evident with Beijing especially in light over their veto of the United Nations security council resolution on Syria.
Indeed, it could be said that a growing Sino-Saudi relationship could reap dividends for the United States in the short to medium term. If Saudi Arabia can use its oil weight to leverage China out of its protective embrace of Iran, or to abandon its objections to a Syria intervention, Washington would uncork some champagne bottles. The use of Saudi crude to effect a more cooperative outlook on regional policy would be a major coup, and is a clear goal of the current diplomatic offensive by Riyadh.
The real danger for the United States, and where Saudi Arabia may be hedging its bets, is in the long term. As Chinese power rises and it may in the coming decades become a viable replacement for the US security guarantee. This would afford Riyadh with what it has always dreamed of, a powerful and compliant protector. An alliance of the autocrats would relieve Saudi Arabia of the ceaseless pressures to reform, to end crackdowns, and to restrain its foreign policy - returning those decisions exclusively to the royal court instead.
More immediately, the decision to forge ties with China may serve as a hedge against current pressures from the United States. Washington may not want to push the envelope with Saudi Arabia, if it believes it will push the al-Saud further into the Chinese orbit. This gives Riyadh wiggle room in its relationship with the United States, and gives China a risk free way to influence US regional policy objectives.
Saudi Arabia has never had a duality in its foreign relations, it has been tethered to the United States virtually since the modern state was founded in the early 1930s, a relationship cemented by a state visit from President Roosevelt in 1945. The creation of a countervailing force with China as an ally is a new game for Saudi Arabia, and a relatively new one for China as well. It is also proving to be an increasingly useful tool for both, and will likely define the regional dynamic in the coming decade.
Joshua Jacobs is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Institute for Gulf Affairs. His analyses have been featured on domestic media outlets in North Africa and the Middle East.
(Copyright 2012 Joshua Jacobs.)
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