Recognition of the necessity for economic reforms accompanied the return of Canadian veterans following World War 2 (WW2). Soldiers had defended democratic ideals with their lives, and there was little sympathy for oppressive, fascist-leaning legislation implemented during the war under the auspices of protecting production levels and profit margins. Although unionization made substantial progress before and during the war, many sectors remained woefully under-organized. Labourʼs success hinged upon its ability to amass and maintain numerical majorities in a society fragmented by race, gender, religion, occupation, class and language. From 1940-1975, labour pursued securities which opened Canadian society to unprecedented levels of unionization, but opposition from management and the federal government successfully institutionalized hegemony.
Relations between labour and the government fermented during WW2. Labour was typically underrepresented or excluded during the drafting of policies. Realizing that decisions made rarely reflected working-class interests and dissatisfied with the inadequacy of existing legislation, a pursuit of collective bargaining replaced union recognition as labourʼs dominant grievance.1 Industrial union proliferation within the war-time labour market led to increases in wages and improved working conditions, but did not secure adequate wages for most industrial workers. Insecurities over inflation and the escalating cost of living combined with a fearful recollection of severe economic depression and motivated many workers to join unions.2 However, the combo of the War Measures Act – which gave the federal government virtually dictatorial control over the working class – and a wage control policy enacted in 1940 left unions marginalized and diminished. In order to confront these challenges, the labour movement was fundamentally restructured. Craft unions had traditionally relied on controlling a monopoly of available skills in order to cajole employers, but many industrial jobs required little to no skill and striking workers could easily be replaced. Unable to meaningfully withhold access to their skill, industrial unions relied on strength in numerical superiority.3 Industrial workersʼ common experience and resentment of “industrial autocracy” heightened a shared sense of entitlement.4 When employers and the government refused to enforce a profit ceiling, labour chaffed at the blatant hypocrisy. As “equal” participants in the war-effort, industrial workers acknowledged sacrifices needed to be made by labour, employers and the government; but in return they expected “equal rights on the job, in the economy, and in the councils of the nation.”5
Awareness of inequalities during and after WW2 sparked a level of industrial militance unmatched since 1919.6 Many attempts at gaining recognition or concessions ended in defeat, but the cumulative effects reinforced labour solidarity. Complaining of long hours and low wages, workers at the National Steel Car (NASCO) plant in Hamilton sought redress of grievances through a conciliation board. For as long as possible, the Steelworkersʼ Organizing Committee (SWOC) was ignored. When a conciliation board was convened, management turned a deaf ear to the boardʼs decision and SWOC remained unrecognized. On April 29, 1941, the SWOC local unanimously voted to strike, and steelworkers in nearby Trenton and Sault Ste-Marie signaled an inclination to walk out in sympathy. The War Measures Act made such dissent illegal – leading some within the government and management to support police intervention – but the overt federal response was to appoint a controller of the plant. Although the controller was supposedly appointed to implement the conciliation boardʼs report, the federal government had covertly instructed him to leave SWOC unrecognized.7 Rather than meeting directly with SWOC, workers were asked to nominate a “representative collective committee”8 which could be used to fragment the steelworkers and subvert opposition. A compromise was eventually reached following the appointment of a new controller, but the federal government stood “unprepared to support union recognition [and] condoned the establishment of an employer dominated committee [...] to undermine the existing union.”9
Coincident with Hamiltonʼs NASCO strike, SWOC workers in the Peck Rolling Mills plant in Montreal organized and struck for wage increases. The federal government had legislated a freeze in wage increases under P.C. 7740, but after hearing testimony from workers the conciliatory board returned a split decision: majority opinion compared 1941 wages with those paid in 1926-1929, found increases unjustified and was enthusiastically received by the company; minority opinion noted that P.C. 7740 was intended to prevent “wages which were already reasonable from rising unduly,” suggested that it was not illegal to raise unreasonably low wages and recommended an increase in the base wage to 40 cents an hour. Compared with steelworkers in other plants and regions, Peck Rolling Millsʼ wages were substandard, but there was no provision in existing legislation to enforce wage standardization. Indignant following the public release of the conciliatory boardʼs split-report, Peck workers went on strike in April 1941. In a daft ploy to convince strikers to return to work without acknowledging the dispute or SWOC, the federal government increased the minimum wage to 25 cents an hour for women and 35 cents an hour for men.10 The plot was successful and strikers conceded, but the subterfuge exacerbated labourʼs discontentment with a haphazardly enforced wage policy that protected gross inequalities.
Labourʼs disapprobation reached a crescendo following governmental improprieties during the Kirkland Lake mining strike. The local union had organized a strong majority of miners and requested company recognition. When management refused to recognize union representation, the government intervened and appointed a “fact-finding body” to ascertain whether a conciliation board was necessary. After hearing worker testimony, the Industrial Disputes Inquiry Commission proposed the “Kirkland Lake Formula,” which called on workers to appoint “employee committees” and to forget about union recognition. When miners were finally granted a conciliation board, the boardʼs decision – which recommended union recognition – was ignored by management. Miners then applied for a strike vote supervised by the government, as legislated under P.C. 7307. The government strategically procrastinated and forced miners to strike at a most unpropitious time – the dead of winter. The government was ready to compel labour into submission, but was disinterested in accepting compulsory union recognition. The strike predictably ended in defeat, but miners found solidarity among the CCL and TLC, who unsuccessfully attempted to leverage concessions from an indifferent federal government. This experience catalyzed increased politicization among unions and in 1942 both the CCL and TLC launched national campaigns pushing for collective bargaining legislation.11
Many within management and the government actively opposed unions, but labour occasionally benefited from friends in unlikely places. History might remember Hamiltonʼs 1946 Stelco strike quite differently had it not been for the pro-labour sentiments of Chief Magistrate Sam Lawrence and a wellspring of support from veterans. Although Stelco envisioned itself as a “righteous and virtuous” employer, workers grumbled following racially- inspired layoffs that prioritized ethnicity over seniority and competence. Stelcoʼs workers were unionized under the United Steel Workers of America, but they were decidedly more militant than union headquarters. In an attempt to calm the rising storm, the union sent Larry Sefton to help organize dissent. As a moderate, Sefton would be instrumental in replacing communists with “CCF-types”, but his platitudes failed to resonate with combative workers. An incisive American speaker from the CIO, however, elicited an immediate – and illegal – picket of the Stelco plant. Hoping to reveal whether employees or the employer were in violation of the law, Prime Minister Mackenzie King sought conciliation rather than arrests. The federal response was to appoint a controller, staff the factory with scabs paid triple normal wages and continue production; however, determined picketers blocked transport into and out of the factory. Picketers were not timorous and did not hesitate to resort to violence in order to maintain the blockade, but a pragmatic decision allowed council woman Nora Francis Hendersen, the “spokesperson of law and order,” to break the picket rather than risk losing public support. Two days after symbolically stabbing labour in the back, Nora pushed for police intervention. 250 Royal Canadian Mounted Police and another 250 of Ontarioʼs Provincial Police were summoned, and unequivocal backlash immediately followed. More than 15,000 took to the streets in protest. Ordinary citizens and the entire Studebaker workforce joined veterans in historic opposition to fascist tyranny. Lawrenceʼs pro-labour municipal government refused to impose a crackdown and police were unwilling to quarrel with the war heroes. A victim of the Red Scare, Mackenzie King feared the momentum communists would enjoy following a union win and used subterfuge to settle the strike after an 86 day siege.12
Communism continued to be victimized by intense politicization. Following a ban on the Canadian Communist Party in 1941, many of its members reorganized within the Labour-Progressive Party (LPP). Communists persisted in championing economic reforms and public education campaigns under this banner, but negative public sentiment and a split in the leftist vote significantly limited their potential for political success. An Iron Curtain fell across Europe and Igor Gouzenkoʼs Soviet spy ring was discovered in Ottawa, triggering a Canadian witch-hunt that was used by employers and politicians to suppress dissent of the status quo. In the 1950ʼs and 60ʼs this anti-communist rhetoric was especially virulent in Alberta, where miners had a tradition of socialist sympathies. Prominent civic areas had been given leftist names, the school board declared the anniversary of the Russian revolution a holiday, and socialist provincial legislators targeted the wealthy by laying a tax on pedigreed dogs. In response, rabidly anti-communist authorities sanctioned the RCMPʼs gestapo tactics to acquire a dossier on every major leftist leader in Canada. Hoping to stay in office, liberal politicians accepted a social contract that called on them to “kick out the leftists.” Their declining power was hastened with the incremental adoption of steam-based technologies, which devastated the coal industry and undercut the militant backing of communists and socialists. The discovery of oil united the LPP and CCF in a push to nationalize the industry, but politicians and corporate interests were far more interested in profits than Canadian sovereignty and the movement was panned as a “communist plot.”13
Blatant greed and misanthropy within corporate capitalism alienated some labour groups that had traditionally taken a soft line on corporatism. Beginning in the 1950ʼs, the evolution of the Confederation de travailleurs catholiques du Canadaʼs (CTCC) position on corporatism was a major factor in Quebecʼs Quiet Revolution.14 Ideologic transformations within the CTCC followed recognition of the similarities between corporatism and fascism,15 the inherent inferiority of denominational labour groups,16 and a growing acceptance of union action.17 Facing strong resistance to their campaigns for corporate reform, the CTCC came to see “liberal capitalism” as idolatry of profit and proposed alternatives aimed at humanizing the economic system. Since recognition of union representation was a hard battle where clear majorities were key, the CTCCʼs insistence on Catholicism was gradually replaced with a nondenominational Christian character.18 The secularization of membership requirements revitalized the CTCC with new ideas, but their political ambitions were mostly limited to educational campaigns.19 Although the CTCC was amendable to organizing affiliated unions, there was an implacable refusal to affiliate under international unions.20 Inter-union rivalries limited the CTCCʼs impact and continued to complicate labour solidarity.
Inter-union solidarity may be difficult to procure or maintain, but when achieved it is capable of remarkable accomplishments. The producersʼ strike of 1958-1959 enjoyed tremendous popular support, but it also generated an unprecedented schism in labour solidarity. Locked into obsolete contracts with no chance of review, fringe benefits, or job security, Quebecʼs francophone television producers petitioned the Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) for union recognition. Citing federal law, the CBC rationalized declining the request on the basis that producers exercised authority and were a part of management. Since management was forbidden from collective organization and bargaining, producers were also excluded. Successive failures at the negotiating table pressed producers into striking on December 29, 1958. Francophone artists, media darlings and intellectuals launched a public relations campaign and public support rallied behind the producers. The Union des Artists and over 2,000 of Radio Canadaʼs script writers, prop coordinators and set designers supported the producersʼ picket lines as a matter of principle. As the strike dragged on, many protesters faced exceptional financial duress. In order to raise funds, the Union des Artists traveled around the province hosting “The Difficulties are Temporary”, a traveling variety show attended by most of the periodʼs stars. Unfortunately this level of solidarity did not extend to francophone/anglophone relations. Quebecʼs anglophone population did not think the producersʼ efforts were relevant, and their willingness to break pickets made language a clear line of demarcation. Following a march on Ottawa, parliamentarian Egen Chambers tried to end the stalemate with more negotiations. A weekʼs worth of deliberations produced an agreement both sides accepted, so when the CBC rescinded a few days later, public contempt swelled. Police were sent to disperse the picketers, but they were overwhelmed. In a fit of tyranny, twenty horse-mounted police charged the crowd. Jean Marchand, Rene Levesque and many other protestors were forcibly arrested. Newspapers unilaterally condemned the brutality and further marshaled public support for the producers, but the CBC continued resisting ratification of Chambersʼ agreement until the federal government intervened and forced a resolution. The producers were able to capitalize on public sentiment to force concessions, but other oppressed labour groups would find this much more difficult.21
Black porters were consistently manipulated by rail companies and disenfranchised by institutional racism. The Canadian Pacific Railway and the Canadian National Railways imported scores of American blacks to work as porters in Canadian trains22 – even during depression.23 They were paid substantially less than whites,24 dehumanized,25 used to replace higher-paid whites with seniority,26 and ruthlessly prevented from organizing. Blacks were excluded or marginalized from most contemporary industrial unions,27 and those showing an inclination to organize were quickly fired.28 Constant travel imbued porters with a greater sense of culture and allowed them to enjoy “higher status among non-professional blacks,”29 but professional obligations often conflicted with familial ties. Porters pursued visitation privileges for their families, vacation time, wage increases and professional mobility. Their victimization within a “submerged split labour market was the result of a collaboration between higher priced labour and employers who shared the same ethnic stereotypes.”30 Opposed by unionized whites, management and the government, the threat of organized blacks aggravated ethnic antagonism.31
Various ethnic groups used diverse tactics to confront the racism permeating Canadian society. In the wake of WW2 Italians made up a significant portion of the Canadian immigration boom. Toronto served as the dominant destination for labourers fleeing harsh living conditions in Southern Italy.32Since women were “familiar with economic strategies that involved the temporary breakup of the family unit [in order to secure] its long-term survival,” males often left their families in Italy until they could earn enough money to finance their immigration.33 Italian females were dependent on male relatives34, confined by culture, and segregated by familial allegiances,35 but they were instrumental in managing the household economy36 and privately wielded great influence.37 Women shouldered immense domestic responsibilities,38 contributed to husbandry39 and found ways to earn extra cash.40 Since Italian culture places a premium on clannishness,41 integration within the Canadian cultural milieu was unlikely; however, family-linked chain migration “acted as a buffer against the alienating features of immigration.”42 This form of limited solidarity helped immigrants grapple with prejudice, but it prevented them from solidifying working-class consciousness.43 Italian women often sought employment in domestic services and manufacturing, where their cheap labour depressed wages and strengthened ethnic divisions.44 Disinterest in unionization lasted until the 1960ʼs, when self-respect motivated Italian women to push for more recognition.45
Another expansion of organization occurred among civil servants. The federal government sought public regulation of the economy, the provincial governments controlled natural resources, and beginning in the 1940s Keynesian interventionism ballooned Canadian bureaucracy to unprecedented levels. Nova Scotia went from 1,900 civil servants in 1953 to 7,300 in 1976, and other provinces experienced similar growth.46 White collar workers in the private sector lacked the job security or benefits of government employees; however, civil servants were traditionally ensnared within a pro-management service ethic where consent became a matter of patriotism,47 and were shielded by an employer “immune to the general rules of collective bargaining.”48 This produced asymmetrical unionization. The organization of civil servants was actively opposed by the government and management. Nova Scotiaʼs provincial employees were denied inclusion under the Trade Union Act and the liberal government blocked union recognition for employees affected by the Civil Service Act. Employers lacked any compulsion to grant concessions since there was no legislated procedure for conflict resolution and effective dissent was seen as “incompatible with the basic principles of public service.”49 Despite their subjugation, civil servants prioritized good relations with the government through labour/management cooperation, and militancy was constrained.50 This goodwill was not reciprocated and labourʼs efforts were nearly derailed, but by the 1960s dissent became a political liability and concessions already secured by the private sector were extended to government employees.51
Canadian postal workers were also plagued by a treacherous leadership. Postal workers and letter carriers had been organized under the Federal Association of Letter Carriers and Canadian Postal Employees Association, but there was no union recognition, grievance procedure or collective agreement. Between 1956-1965 the Treasury Board granted two small wage increases, froze wages twice and rescinded promised increases twice. Although the federal government lacked the money to pay labourers a living wage, it continued to subsidize business use of 2nd class mail. Employment levels were static, but postal volume had doubled within a decade and inhumane work-measurement schemes were introduced to further increase production. While employees worked twelve hour days with no overtime pay, association leadership fretted over neckties and was clearly disinterested in militant opposition to management. However, militant employees circumvented association leadership and secured concessions directly from Ottawa in a victory that stimulated employee confidence and nurtured an acceptance of strikes as a legitimate method of dissent. Militance proliferated, and in June 1965, Montrealʼs postal workers demanded $660/month. A bewildered federal government appointed Justice Anderson to examine the situation, but his recommendation of $300-360/month was met with derision by Willie Houle and the rank-and-file. Ignoring the employee associationsʼ complacent leadership and the complete lack of strike funds, Houle united with disgruntled postal workers in Vancouver in a synchronized strike of letter carriers and postal clerks in Montreal, Vancouver, Toronto, Hamilton and 30 other urban centers across Canada. The views of labourʼs established leadership were clarified when the president of Torontoʼs Letter Carriers Association broke picket lines and publicly called for strikers to be jailed, the Canadian Congress of Labour leaned heavily on strike leaders to force an end to the strike, and the Postal Workers of Canada ridiculed the dissent as “irresponsible.” Leadership in the Postal Workersʼ Brotherhood conspired to fraudulently undercut support, confuse strikers and sew distrust in the strikeʼs leadership, but even the Army could not dampen the strikersʼ high morale. In a historic turning point for Canadaʼs civil servants, postal workers in Montreal struck until they were offered a wage/benefits package of $550/month. Returning workers were infused with dignity and antipathy, leadership was quickly voted out, and new labour organizations were created.52 Postal workers illustrated the power of a unified labour movement, but scurrilous leadership and agents of the government would not hesitate to resort to subterfuge.
Following WW2, Canadian labour aggressively pursued securities from employers and a hostile government. Although the federal government restricted wages and legislated dissent, labour stood ready to strike. Opposition from management continued to threaten labour solidarity, and increasingly relied on subversion and propaganda to placate workers. From 1945-1965, the unionization of labour progressively penetrated Canadian society, previously unorganized workers battled against an entrenched oligarchy, and traditionally business-friendly labour organizations increasingly adopted humanist platforms. Labour leaders launched historic strikes and marshaled tremendous public sympathy, but solidarity could be threatened by language and ethnicity; while the specter of the Cold War provided a rationale for silencing opposition to the status quo. Labour had demonstrated all the necessities for successful dissent, but political integration of the capitalist agenda ensured a long, uphill battle.
References:
• The Back Row: Labourʼs Cold War in Alberta [video recording]. Produced and directed by Don Bouzek. Edmonton: D. Active Productions, 2005.
• Calliste, A. “Sleeping Car Porters in Canada: An Ethnically Submerged Split Labour Market.” Canadian Working Class History. Eds. Laurel Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth. Toronto: Canadian Scholarsʼ Press, 2000. p. 597-615.
• Defying the Law (Building a Nation Series) [video recording]. Produced by Marta Nielsen Hastings & David Wesley. Directed by Marta Nielsen Hastings. Toronto: Norflicks Productions, 1997.
• Iacovetta, F. “From Contadina to Worker: Southern Italian Immigrant Working Women in Toronto, 1947-1962.” Canadian Working Class History. Eds. Laurel Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth. Toronto: Canadian Scholarsʼ Press, 2000. p. 620-640.
• MacDowell, L. S. “The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During WWII.” Canadian Working Class History. Eds. Laurel Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth. Toronto: Canadian Scholarsʼ Press, 2000. p. 526-544.
• Memory and Muscle: The Postal Strike of 1965 [video recording]. Produced and directed by Michael Ostroff. Ottawa: Canadian union of Postal Workers, 1995.
• The Producersʼ Strike (Building a Nation Series) [video recording]. Produced by Richard Nielsen, Max Cacopardo, Jean Lebel, & Roger Racine. Directed by Jean Lebel. Montreal: Production de 9 Mars, 1959, 1999.
• Rouillard, J. “Major Changes in the Confederation de Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada, 1940-1960.” Canadian Working Class History. Eds. Laurel Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth. Toronto: Canadian Scholarsʼ Press, 2000. p. 575-595.
• Thomson, A. “The Nova Scotia Civil Service Association, 1956-1967.” Canadian Working Class History. Eds. Laurel Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth. Toronto: Canadian Scholarsʼ Press, 2000. p. 641-662.
1 MacDowell, L. S. p. 526.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. p. 532-3.
11 Ibid. p. 534-5.
12 Defying the Law.
13 The Back Row: Labourʼs Cold War in Alberta.
14 Rouillard, J. p. 575-6.
15 Ibid. p. 577.
16 Ibid. p. 581.
17 Ibid. p. 584-5.
18 Ibid. p. 580-1.
19 Ibid. p. 592.
20 Ibid. p. 588.
21 The Producersʼ Strike.
22 Calliste, A. p. 597.
23 Ibid. p. 599.
24 Ibid. p. 597.
25 Ibid. p. 608.
26 Ibid. p. 599.
27 Ibid. p. 600.
28 Ibid. p. 602, 604.
29 Ibid. p. 599.
30 Ibid. p. 611.
31 Ibid. p. 610.
32 Iacovetta, F. p. 621.
33 Ibid. p. 627.
34 Ibid. p. 622.
35 Ibid. p. 623.
36 Ibid. p. 629.
37 Ibid. p. 625.
38 Ibid. p. 624.
39 Ibid. p. 625.
40 Ibid. p. 629.
41 Ibid. p. 623.
42 Ibid. p. 628.
43 Ibid. p. 634.
44 Ibid. p. 631.
45 Ibid. p. 635.
46 Thomson, A.
47 Ibid. p. 641.
48 Ibid. p. 654.
49 Ibid. p. 643.
50 Ibid. p. 645.
51 Ibid. p. 657.
52 Memory and Muscle: The Postal Strike of 1965.
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