Brown accused of cover-up: PM under fire as key papers on Iraq war are kept confidential

Gordon Brown was accused of 'gagging' the Iraq inquiry last night as it emerged the Government is blocking the release of secret documents about the war.

Senior MPs from all three main parties said the decision bore all the hallmarks of an official 'cover-up' and made a mockery of the Prime Minister's pledge of a fully open investigation.

Frustration boiled over as Labour's former Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, who gave the green light for the 2003 invasion after changing his mind and declaring it legal, gave evidence.

Lord Goldsmith himself condemned the Government's refusal to declassify key papers, meaning they cannot be made public or even quoted from by the inquiry panel during questioning.

'I didn't agree with the decision that has apparently been made that certain documents are not to be declassified, but I will give the evidence that the inquiry seeks,' he said.

The inquiry's mild-mannered chairman, Sir John Chilcot, told him: 'We share your frustration.'

Another member of the inquiry team, former diplomat Sir Roderick Lyne, referred sarcastically to 'this bountiful Government' having agreed to the release of one document.

A spokesman for the inquiry said the panel could 'talk around' declassified documents in 'general terms', but was unable to quote from them or ask witnesses to discuss them in detail.

The row is thought to centre on memos and documents covering Lord Goldsmith's initial advice on the legality of war in the months leading up to the March 2003 invasion, when he believed it would breach international law.

Other key papers which have not been disclosed include Tony Blair's private letters to George Bush in the run-up to the conflict, in which he apparently promised the U.S. President 'we will be with you', and memos to Mr Blair from his then foreign policy adviser Sir David Manning.

On the spot: Attorney General Lord Goldsmith condemned the Government refusal to declassify documents at the Chilcot Inquiry yesterday

LORD GOLDSMITH'S U-TURN

JULY 24, 2002: Tells Downing Street self-defence and humanitarian intervention are no basis for war. Warns Blair in writing he can't agree to war with U.S. without UN support

NOV 7, 2002: Warns Jack Straw can't expect it to be 'alright on the night' after first UN resolution is passed

NOV 8, 2002: UN Security Council pass Resolution 1441 declaring Iraq in 'material breach' of its obligations and need for weapons inspectors to return

NOV 11, 2002: Tells Downing Street he's 'pessimistic' about the chances of war without another UN resolution

JAN 14, 2003: Blair given draft advice saying another resolution authorising use of force is needed

JAN 23, 2003: Meeting with Sir Jeremy Greenstock for first-hand account of UN negotiations. Told Russia and France know they've lost but unconvinced. Writes to Blair to say view unchanged.

FEB 10, 2003: Meets with U.S. officials and lawyers in Washington

FEB 12, 2003: At meeting with legal assistant in London, decides no new resolution needed and to revise early draft opinion

FEB 27, 2003: Tells No10 he's changed his mind, giving 'green light' for war

MARCH 7, 2003: Blair given 13-page legal opinion saying 'reasonable case' for war, but warns of possible legal action

MARCH 17, 2003: Upgrades advice to say first resolution gives authority for war

MARCH 18, 2003: MPs vote to back war by 412 to 149

MARCH 20, 2003: Invasion begins

The Government drew up a 'protocol' on the release of information when it set up the inquiry, setting out nine grounds on which publication of potentially damaging details could be blocked.

Secret intelligence documents, which are crucial to uncovering the truth about the way the Government 'sexed up' the case for war, are among those that can be held back, as can papers deemed to contain 'commercially sensitive' information.

The Tories and the LibDems said fears that ministers were attempting to 'suffocate' the inquiry were being borne out.

They said the refusal to release key documents would hamper the questioning of the central witness - Mr Blair - who is due to appear tomorrow.

Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague said: 'Gordon Brown said unequivocally that "no British document and no British witness will be beyond the scope of the inquiry".

'It would be unacceptable for the Government to backtrack on that clear commitment.

'The Government's reported unwillingness to co-operate fully will do little to dispel the suspicion that Brown's Downing Street would have preferred a more restricted inquiry.'

LibDem leader Nick Clegg said: 'Despite Gordon Brown's claim that he has "nothing to hide" this has all the hallmarks of a cover-up. The protocol on the release of documents is being used to gag the inquiry.

'The Government must immediately declassify certain key documents ahead of Tony Blair's hearing: The memo from Sir David Manning to Tony Blair dated January 31, 2003, and the letter from Tony Blair to George W Bush, sent July 2002.

'Labour are leaving themselves open to charges of outright sabotage of Chilcot's work to save their own political skins.'

Labour MP John McDonnell said: 'This is contrary to the assurances that this would be a completely open and accessible inquiry.

'It demonstrates that the Government is anxious about what these documents will reveal. People will rightly ask questions about what they have got to hide.'

Lindsey German, of the Stop the War Coalition, said: 'At every stage, the Government has done its best to conceal evidence about the decision to go to war from the public.

'Initially, this inquiry was to be held in secret. It is refusing to apportion blame. Now we find that crucial documents are being withheld.

Enlarge

'Green light': Lord Goldsmith's formal legal advice to Tony Blair in March 2003

'There is only one conclusion to draw: That they contain evidence even more damning to the Government than that already heard.'

The Cabinet Office said the inquiry was entitled to request and view any document, no matter how sensitive, from Government departments.

But a spokesman added: 'Many of these documents are highly classified, for example in view of their potential impact on national security or international relations.

'If the inquiry wishes to make public reference to or release into the public domain any of this classified material, it can request this of the Government.

'Many documents have been declassified and the inquiry has made these publicly available on its website.

'In some instances, the Government has required further time to consider the inquiry's requests.'

The classified documents the critics say must be made public

MEMO: March 12, 2002. Sir David Manning, foreign policy adviser, to Tony Blair (partially leaked)

Sir David recorded that he had had dinner with Condoleezza Rice, U.S. national security adviser, and had a 'frank, one-on-one' discussion on Iraq.

He told Blair: 'I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was very different than anything in the States.

'And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if we pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result. Failure was not an option.'

Joint forces: Tony Blair reputedly told President Bush that Britain would 'be there' if the U.S. decided it had to take military action against Saddam

LETTER: July 2002. Tony Blair to George Bush (referred to in inquiry but not leaked)

Alastair Campbell told the inquiry that Blair's message was broadly: 'We share the analysis, we share the concern, we are going to be with you in making sure that Saddam Hussein faces up to his obligations and that Iraq is disarmed.'

Campbell added: 'If that cannot be done diplomatically and it is to be done militarily, Britain will be there. That would be the tenor of the communication to the president.'

MEMO: January 14, 2003 (referred to at inquiry but not released)

Lord Goldsmith gives Mr Blair a five-page draft legal opinion which says a further resolution specifically authorising the use of force is necessary.

MEMO: January 31, 2003. Sir David Manning to Tony Blair (partially leaked)

In the memo, paraphrasing Bush's comments at a meeting, Sir David noted: 'The start date for the military campaign was now pencilled in for March 10. This was when the bombing would begin.'