I wanted to talk to you today about a topic that is on everyone’s
lips at the moment: the re-privatisation of RBS. Because I think there
is a disturbing story here that is not being widely reported in the
mainstream press. And it goes right to the heart of the economic
problems that Britain will face over the next few years. It certainly
affects your investments.
When Stephen Hester took the head job at RBS, he was given the task
of shrinking and de-risking the bank. The ultimate goal was to bring
about a sufficient recovery so that the government could reprivatise at a
higher share price, and make back the €45bn they had invested in
2008-9.
Now that Stephen Hester is being pushed out to make way for a new
head of RBS – who will take the bank private again before the end of
2014 – the market is speculating about just how fixed the UK banks now
are.
Stock prices have rallied strongly from the lows, though they are
still well below where the government bought shares in Lloyds and RBS on
our behalf. However, with the political timeline fixed for a sale ahead
of the next election in 2015, the story about the banks’ solvency has
become political. And that is where this story gets a little dirty
Why these banks can’t lend
The trouble with banks is that the public rarely knows the true health of their
balance sheets.
The big four British banks – Barclays, Lloyds, RBS and HSBC – all had
strong balance sheets (by which I mean they reported strong capital
ratios) ahead of the crisis. But it turned out all was not as it seemed
when disaster struck. And since then investors have largely been
operating in the dark.
Still there’s nothing like a share price rally to make your average
broker believe that the banks’ balance sheets are fixed. The problem is
that every historical precedent has shown the banks to be hiding bad
debts on their balance sheets for several years before they finally get
fixed. In the wake of a serious banking crisis, banks can’t show the
full extent of losses because these would wipe out too much of their
capital, so they parcel out losses against earnings over time.
The way we, the public can see that the banks are hiding losses
(though we can only ever guess how large these may be) is by watching
their behaviour. No matter how fixed a bank claims it is, no bank has
ever been shown to shrink loans when policy was easy unless it was
subsequently shown that the bank in question was suffering solvency
issues. Therefore if the banks really are fixed, we will see it in the
form of rising bank lending. After all, the banks are sitting on record
amounts of unused liquidity in the form of excess bank reserves, so
there’s absolutely no liquidity constraint.
Well, up until the start of 2012, record liquidity and the lowest
base rates for over 300 years had done nothing to encourage the banks to
lend. How could they? As we know, they were sitting on further as yet
undeclared and capital eroding losses. How big are those losses?
Well, we don’t know exactly. Investor consultancy PIRC reckons that
hidden losses at British banks come to a total of £40bn. I wouldn’t be
surprised if losses were five times that size. Here’s the rub. The big
four British banks sport some £255bn in core
tier 1 capital,
so if hidden losses of £200bn were to be revealed, so would the fact
that the sector is still practically insolvent. Banks have already
realised £230bn of losses, but that has taken almost five years of
earnings.
The figure below shows how much progress banks have made towards repairing their balance sheets.
Bank Cumulative Loan Write-Offs as a Percentage of Peak Assets
Source: Companies data, Westhouse Securities
As you see, in a typical banking crisis, banks end up having to write
off about 10% of their loans. In a bad crisis, they write off 15%. If
it’s a Japanese scale crisis, they write off 20%. That can take anything
between five and 15 years to play out. And the big four have made very
little progress so far compared to their US counterparts.
Since 2008, US banks have written-off 12.6% of their loans. And so
they may soon be strong enough to start lending again. But the big four
UK banks have only written down 6.2%.
Another big problem is that half the sector’s capital resides at just
one bank: HSBC. But because HSBC has also done more loan-loss
realisation than any other bank, it’s a really good bet that far less
than half of the remaining losses will come from HSBC.
That leaves the other three banks, RBS, Barclays and Lloyds, in a
tricky position. As hedge fund manager Chris Hohn pointed out in a
letter to the Financial Services Authority earlier this year, a £20bn
post-tax loss would send Lloyds’
capital ratio below 5%. The same would also be true for the other two banks.
That’s because liquidity is not the real underlying problem here.